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alleged economic feasibility of the shuttle a major selling point, in fact many of the tasks could be handled more effectively by a less spectacular unmanned robot. To demonstrate cost effectiveness, a heavy launch schedule was erected. This went hand in hand with the creation of the illusion of utter reliability; an illusion celebrated and reaffirmed by the creation of the civilian in space program. Does the syllogiam need to be spelled out? If it weren't safe, would we risk the lives of our precious citizens, especially a teacher of the young? To some degree it can be said that organizational factors promoted evasion rather than solution of the problem of reliability. Among these are the vast decentralization of the program, diffusion of authority, perfusion of vested interests in segments of the program, profusion of middle managers, and exclusion of the astronaut core from decisions regarding mission safety. On the other hand, modern technology renders easy communication across thousands of miles and across many levels of bureaucratic hierachization. It is hypothesized that decentralization itself is not the only pathogen but that the ecopolitical structure within which NASA operated facilitated the creation and encrustation of bureaucratic obfuscation, rationalization, and denial. Examples: the aforementioned Mr. Mulloy in February Nineteen Eighty-Five gave a detailed briefing to NASA administrators on the history of the O-ring problem and then concluded that the degree of erosion represented an "acceptable risk". Many other examples from many other NASA administrators exist. It is hypothesized that organizational and cognitive-perceptual factors co-mingled, coexisted, and reenforced each other in the creation of the illusion of reliability and its corollary - the evasion, denial and obfuscation of urgent safety issues of which the booster seal problem is the prime example. (Another issue, for example, is the reliability of the main engines - initially predicted to be reliable for fifty-five missions - an impossible demand).
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