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carrier was responsib1e for. If the intraplant railroad was not a common carrier, and this was the case at Schenectady, it could not enjoy a piece of the freight rate but could be compensated for work done on behalf of the line-hau1 carrier through an agreement with the carrier based on the costs involved.  On the other hand, the line-haul carrier could perform such included services by operating over the industrial tracks and paying for such trackage arrangements. When, however, the trunk line carriers were required to perform switching services in and about the plant area in excess of the switching service ordinarily incident to the receipt and delivery of cars, the industry was obligated to pay extra charges for these special services.

Railroads, like other sellers of goods and services, could discriminate in rates which they charged and in the services which they offered. They could offer the same services at different prices to different individuals or, at the same prices, purvey different standards of service. One very effective form of discrimination developed in connection with switching allowances to industries and divisions of the through freight rate with plant and industrial railroads. The determination of such allowances presented many difficult problems. Where does the obligation of the carrier cease and that of the shipper or consignee begin? Where is the distinction to be drawn between that switching in the pickup and delivery of cars which it is appropriate for the carrier to perform and that which is plant switching and thus the shipper's or consignee's responsibility? The granting of excessive allowances to such industrial railroads creates discrimination against shippers and consignees not so favored, or those who do not have a plant railroad. And in many cases, small railroads have been created as part of a plant facility and performing no line haul service whatever, solely for the purpose of obtaining exorbitant divisions of the freight rates.

In the early 1930s the railroads were feeling heavy pressure from two directions--the drastic reduction of traffic because of the Depression and the increasing competition from waterways, highways and airways. In 1933 Congress passed The Emergency Transportation Act of 1933 which was intended to help the railroads. One of the emergency provisions of the Act sought to promote the joint use of terminals and avoid excessive allowances for industrial switching. The Act, however, contained some labor protective provisions which seriously tied the hands of railroad management in trying to put some of its suggestions into effect and as a result, the railroads took very indifferent advantage of the emergency provisions and as far as industrial switching allowances went, little was done ultimately. However, the passage of the Act created a lot of activity for a short time and I am quite sure it was responsib1e for the study that we undertook in September. As to the details of just what sparked the whole thing, I'm going to do a lot of guessing.