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-3-

At 3:50 as we were passing Montauk I got a bearing on Philadelphia on 1500 meters, which checked up roughly.  His signals were loud on the radio compass and this was an early indication that the apparatus was O.K.

NC-3 then starting working Destroyers #1 and #2.  Each sent a weather report.  Both #2 and #3 were loud at 4:40 when they transmitted their compass signals, it being noticed that #3 was on 1200 meters, instead of 1500.

At 4:30, New York asked us to listen for his telephone on 1200 meters, but it was not audible.

Siasconset then asked if we had anything for him and NC-3 asked him he was.

Destroyer #1 sent a message to us from Secretary Roosevelt at 4:51, which I think he had just received from Boston.

At 5 o'clock (or 1:00 P.M. New York time) I got the time tick from Arlington, switching it to the Navigator's phones so he could check his chronometers.

Immediately afterward Chatham Air Station sent a request for our position, followed by a relay from the "Baltimore" at Halifax, giving weather conditions at that point.  One thing in the report which alarmed me was a wind velocity of 37 miles per hour from the northwest at 4 P.M.  This I immediately passed forward to the Navigator, as we had not yet become accustomed to the intercommunicating phones.  Chatham had evidently not heard us acknowledge for the messages from Admiral Knapp and the Acting Secretary, as he repeated them, for which I was obliged to gently rebuke him as it was causing undue interference.

At 6 P.M. NC-3 sent a message to Seasconset to the effect that the division had passed Chatham Light at 5:47.

At 6:30 the Navigator had me send a message to the flag-plane that we had passed over Destroyer #1 at 6:18, and that we were running on three motors.

At 6:45 we landed, after having shut down both center motors.  I tried to send during the glide, but could not get a spark, consequently could not tell the destroyers that we were landing.  It was afterward determined that the radio generator turned up only when the center tractor was running, showing that the air speed of the plane did not influence the speed of the generator.  From the pilots I learned that this had been a very flat glide.  Other reasons will be discussed later as to why the generator should be located clear of the propeller slip stream.

After we landed the Navigator passed me a message to send, in the event that I could raise one of the stations.  It was to the effect that we were in Lat. 42-21, Long. 68-21 and would probably not require assistance.