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from Japan who had come to America to study. Dr. Waldman wrote a note to his friend telling him of the bomb and asking him to urge the Japanese to surrender. This note was put in a blast gauge and dropped from Sweeney's plane. We proceeded to the I.P. (Initial Point), where I initiated a 360 degree turn to the left and Sweeney remained in formation with Tibbets. There was a tone control coming from Tibbets' plane that stopped when the bomb was released from the Enola Gay. It detonated by proximity fuse (electronic fuse) 1800 feet above the target. Hopkins and I had calculated that it would take approximately 40 seconds for the bomb to drop from the Enola Gay to the point where it would detonate above the target. It actually took 42 seconds. Waldman had only six seconds of film in the camera, and we lost two seconds of film there. At the 1990 reunion of the 509th, Adolph Gasser told me that Waldman had forgotten to open the shutter on the camera, so we never got any photographs of the blast with that camera.

George Caron, the tail gunner on the Enola Gay, had his own camera and took some pictures of the mushroom, on of which was published. Russ Gackenbach, my navigator, also had a camera and took one picture. We had been cautioned not to take personal cameras on this mission, but Russ and I decided he should take one in case Dr. Waldman's camera or pictures failed.

I had one minute to make my turn toward the target. The crew of No. 91 had a front row seat. Capt. Strudwick and Dr. Waldman were in the bombardier's seat, I was in the pilot's seat with Gackenbach standing behind me and Jim Corliss was behind Jim Anderson, my co-pilot. Mel Bierman, assistant flight engineer; Joe DiJulio, radar operator; and Tony Capua, tail gunner were in the rear of the plane.

When the bomb detonated, there was a brilliant flash which was partially obscured by the special goggles we had been issued for the mission. When I saw the flash, I had to take the goggles off because I couldn't see my co-pilot, Jim Anderson. It seemed as if the sun had come out of the earth and exploded. Smoke boiled around the flash as it rose. The thin layer of clouds, about 4,000 feet below us, rippled like water then a stone is thrown into it. You could see this for miles. This is the thing I remember most vividly. The shock wave from the blast reached my plane and it felt and sounded as if a monster hand had slapped the side of the plane. This occurred about 15 miles away from ground zero as I was flying towards the mushroom cloud which had already reached our altitude and continued to climb above us. I flew around the perimeter of the mushroom cloud three times. We had been instructed not to fly into the cloud as it might make us "sterile". I made my last turn and began my journey back to Tinian.

Parsons ordered Dick Nelson, radio operator on the Enola Gay, to radio back to General Farrell on Tinian the following: "Results clear cut, successful in all respects. Visible results greater than Trinity. Conditions normal in airplane following delivery. Proceeding to Tinian." This message was monitored by my radio operator, Warren Coble. Tibbets returned to Tinian. To show him the respect he deserved, Sweeney and I throttled back so Tibbets could arrive at Tinian alone.

Dutch Van Kirk, the navigator on the Enola Gay, navigated the plane perfectly. Tom Ferebee, the bombardier on the Enola Gay, hit a bull's-eye.

After the bomb was dropped, all commanders were promoted to Major. One of them, Ralph Taylor, had kept a very detailed diary and sent them to an aunt who was a school teacher in the states. He told me, "Major Marquardt, I wrote about you today."

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The following is a summary of the Hiroshima Mission:

[[underlined]]Mission Planning Summary[[/underlined]]

Field Order: #13
Special Bombing Mission: #13
Mission Executed: 6 August 1945

1. PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE 509TH COMPOSITE GROUP

Early in June, 1945 this headquarters was informed one Atomic Bomb would be available for use against the enemy on 6 August 1945. The primary limiting factor was production. By 5 August 1945, all was in readiness to initiate the first Atomic Bomb attack in the history of the world. The bomb was ready, weather was satisfactory, and the carefully selected crew was all trained (See report Number 1, 509th Composite Group, Page 1, paragraph 1)

2. TARGETS SELECTED FOR ATTACK

A. Primary Target: 90.30-Hiroshima Urban Industrial Area.AP 063096, AP Reference: XXI BomCom Litho Mosaic Hiroshima Area, No. 90.30-Urban.

B. Secondary Target: 90-34-168 Kokura Arsenal and City. AP 104082, AP reference: XXI BomCom Litho Mosaic Kokura Arsenal, No 90.34-168

C. Tertiary Target: 90.36-Nagasaki Urban Area. AP 114061 AP Reference: XXI BomCom Litho Mosaic Nagasaki Area, Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works, No. 90.36-546.

Weather aircraft were dispatched to all three targets to relay strike-time weather forecast back to the strike force. However, since it was so desirable that the primary be hit if possible, rather than the other two assigned targets, instructions were given to the strike aircraft to pass close enough themselves to the primary target, regardless of the weather aircraft's broadcasts, to insure that a visual bombing opportunity on the primary was not missed. However, after that check, the strike aircraft were to proceed to [[underlined]] either [[/underlined]] the secondary or tertiary, [[underlined]] depending [[/underlined]] on the weather aircraft.

Although the bomb had a very extensive MEA, because it was so expensive and because the important areas of the urban targets were so concentrated, it was essential that visual bombing be accomplished to make the attack efficient. Radar was to be used as an aid, but if visual check on the target-sighting operation could not be made with the Norden bombsight, the crew was to bring the bomb back to base. To permit the crew additional chance of obtaining a visual sighting operation, two targets, in addition to the primary, were assigned.

3. REASONS FOR TARGET SELECTION

Of the four cities set aside for Atomic Bomb attack, Niigata was discarded because it was so poorly laid out for this sort of an attack - the industrial concentration and the residential-small factory areas were relatively widely separated. Of the other three, Nagasaki was the poorest of the layouts, and it had a prisoner of war camp nearby; so, it was made tertiary. The other two-Hiroshima and Kokura- were well laid out and relatively important, but Kokura had a prisoner of war camp and Hiroshima had none to our knowledge; so Hiroshima was made the primary.

As for the target itself, Hiroshima was highly important as an industrial target. Prior to this attack, Hiroshima ranked as the largest city in the Japanese homeland (except Kyoto) which remained undamaged following a wave of B-29 incendiary strikes. The city had a population of 344,000 in 1940.

It is an army city - headquarters of the 5th division and a primary port of embarkation. The entire northeastern and eastern sides of the city are military zones. Prominent in the north-central part of the city are the Army Division Headqquarters marked by the Hiroshima Castle, numerous barracks,