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Army Air Forces should receive information from the Air Forces attached to the Fleet, but to prohibit their seeking intelligence of the enemy in the zone where he is to be found is to invite disaster. The futility of requiring the Army Air Service to depend upon Naval Forces for overseas scouting from shore bases is further disclosed by the fact that paragraph 3, Part 1, of Reference (b) prescribes that "It is a policy of the Navy Department that Naval vessels and aircraft assigned to Naval Districts in the continental United States shall be kept at a minimum so that all naval vessels which will add to power of the United States Fleet may be assigned to it."

(2) It may be assumed, safely, that our coasts will be endangered only by war with some coalition of powers whose navies will be superior to ours. In such an emergency our Naval doctrine as enunciated, in Part 2 of Reference (B), requires the concentration of the United States Fleet in a base well advanced from our coast line or on some section of our coast. Aerial attacks on our coasts may be expected either in the nature of raids by fast airplane carriers or attacks in force from similar vessels screened from our Fleet by the battle fleet of the enemy. If effect is given to the recommendations contained in Reference (C) and proper facilities are provided, Army Air Forces concentrated on our coasts will be prepared not only to perform efficiently the functions at present assigned, but also to protect our coasts and coastal shipping against all such attacks provided it is now assigned the functions of overseas scouting and of protecting our coastal communications in order that its personnel may be properly trained in time of peace..

(3) The superiority of airplanes over seaplanes for coast defense is recognized in the following sentence taken from Part 2 of Reference (B) - "Airplanes are more efficient that seaplanes for bombing and torpedo attack because they can carry a greater load of bombs or a larger torpedo." I understand that Naval plans call for a large number of aircraft to man numerous Naval air shore stations to be located along the coasts of the United States, Panama and our insular Possessions. To continue to charge our Naval Air Forces with functions which can be performed by Army Air Forces with superior weapons is, through the burden thus thrust upon our aircraft industry, to deny the Army Air Forces airplanes in order that Naval Air Forces may be supplied with inferior weapons for the accomplishment of a mission improperly assigned. The greater efficiency of the airplane is further recognized in charging the Army Air Forces with the defense of all shore establishments against enemy aircraft in Paragraph 2 of Reference (A) and in the approved recommendation of the Joint Board contained in their No. 303 (Serial No. 48) which assigns to the Army Air Service the defense by aircraft of Naval shore stations. The same force that will be used to protect Naval shore stations and other shore establishments against attack by aircraft, may be used to protect our coastal sea communications by reconnaissance and patrol of coastal sea areas, by convoy operations when necessary, and by attacks on enemy submarines, aircraft, or surface vessels engages in trade prevention or passage through the sea area.