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PROVOCATIVE VIEWS By Orvil A. Anderson Today the military potential of Air Power is generally accredited with the capability of destroying the civilization we now enjoy. It has in certain thinking areas made war that would utilize the full striking power of this force too horrible to contemplate. Its destructive power has generated the conclusion that there can be no victory in was if this force is fully applied. These views emanate from recognition of the efficient and effective power of nuclear weapons in destroying surface structures against which they may be employed. This decisive power of air weapons is evaluated in some fields of military thinking as being the direct product of the development of nuclear bombs. Neither reason nor experience supports that evaluation. The same surface structures could be and were destroyed by the orthodox bombs of World War II whenever requisite force was employed against them. There is, however, a significant power difference between these types of bombs. Possessing a lower order of firepower, the weapons of World War II demanded far greater application of force to achieve an equivalent result. But when appropriate force was employed, the destruction achieved was equally decisive. Adding the nuclear bomb to our arsenal of weapons did not elevate Air Power to decisive force. This strategic capability was reached in World War II before the introduction of atomic warheads. The introduction of the nuclear bomb, however, has so expanded the magnitude of decisive power in the air weapon system that it seemingly transcends the comprehension of orthodox military minds and contributes to frustrating confusion as they struggle to tailor and fit this expanding power into the outmoded patterns of military conflict. The reason is basic to the attitude, approach, and manner in which the air weapon system has been, and is being, appraised in the military field of thinking. If its military worth is to be measured, as it has been measured, from a platform of past experience, current and potential values will never be reached and appropriate employment will never be planned. The impact of progress and resultant change will have outmoded those values. But if man have the capacity and courage to face the future through foresight and reasoned prediction, he will readily sense the fact that evolution and change are features that are ever present in his military problems,--in the features of his weapons, and their employment in war. In the history of warfare no other weapon system has been initially so revealing in these factors, -- evolutionary progress and change, -- as the military air arm. At its origin it had as an intrinsic feature the prerogative of initiative in either attack or withdrawal in any action against surface forces. Against this weapon system surface forces could only defend. At its inception this tactical advantage endowed this new military arm with the power potential of decisive force. True, it demanded a healthy technological focus on the growth of its military features to acceptably expanded this potential power into actual worth. But whether this technological support were fostered or fettered, with the passage of time, the air arm had to grow to the dimensions of decisive military force. An inquisitive technology oriented to the dimensions of decisive military force. An inquisitive technology oriented to the intrinsic features of the weapon would with time, insure it. It was inevitable that one of the military powers of the world would sense, to some degree, the potential of this new weapon system and exploit it. If technology were fostered and focused on the combat potential of the airplane, the timely provision of significant force would be its profit. If it were fettered with limiting roles and missions that deterred its growth and received only the technological support of a competitive industry focused 111
