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on profit and loss, the delay in reaching significant military stature was inevitable, and that delay could only be measured in terms of excess hazard and cost. It is now a matter of historical record that fettering factors were ever present in the growth of the air arm. Its growth was slow and it was consistently assigned to limiting roles and missions as an ancillary arm. This supporting role dictated the design of weapons, organization structure and employment in the last World War. This organizational structure, as well as roles and missions, are the dominating features of Air Power today. The power which is widely attributed to the present air arm when equipped with its nuclear weapons clearly outmode these organizational and mission features. If it have the power to destroy a nation, if that should be its mission, certainly it possesses the capability of successfully performing a lesser task. The defeat of opposing military force could be classed as such a task. If an enemy have a concurrent power in its own air weapon system to destroy this nation in terms of its civilization, culture and way of life, reason would demand that our strategy be focused on effectively countering this national threat and that such of our military forces as can be profitably employed be organized for. and committed to, that overriding strategic objective. This would dictate major modification in our present military structure and its missions. If, however, it were possible to outlaw the nuclear bomb on the grounds that it is a superhorrible weapon that transcends man's tolerance, even in contemplation, it might be easier to defend the present military organization and missions. But this would still retain distortion of evolutionary fact. Air Power, with or without the nuclear bomb, has already reached the dimensions of decisive military force. Air Power must win the air war if a nation is to survive. If it fail to win command of the air while that achievement still has strategic meaning, surface forces, either on land or on the water, will never retrieve that loss. This dominating military feature should dictate military structure. But it appears that we must wait a little longer to see that recognition emerge from the roles-and-missions battle that is currently absorbing military thought. But why do we single out a weapon and brand it horrible? do we infer that other weapons are not? Do we assign a human feature to the bayonet, the trench mortar, the napalm bomb? Reason, again, will not support it. Weapons of war that main and kill should all be classed as horrible, and they all demand a lot of mental conditioning before they can be subjected to meditative contemplation without an adverse reaction. True, it will take a lot of bayonet killings to match an atom bomb, but where strategic objective is to be reached a lot of killing is demanded. But do we want to fight a "blood bath" type of war - fought to major degree with man-killing weapons? Do we want to pit our limited manpower resources against the almost limitless horde that would oppose? Would we be moral in relegating the one weapon system which can give, as a minimum, parity with the opposition, - and that in the decisive category of conflict, - and substitute a major surface action in which we would, with certainty, face staggering odds? Let reason give the answer. This paper is published to invite the objective reaction of Foundation members. It is limited by the finite comprehensions of its author. You will support the Foundation by either building it up or tearing it down, provided you will give us your reason in either case. * * * * * * * 112
