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Consequently, Congress must make the final decision when those charged with the formulation of the Policy cannot agree as to the relative importance and methods of employment of the various means available. Such a condition now exists in regard to our air defense. 
Due to the isolated position of our country with reference to other strong nations, the need of a definite, sound policy of defense has not been a vital necessity. During the last few years, however, this condition has changed, and since the World War the rapid development of aircraft and their use in warfare have counteracted many advantages that we may have possessed due to this isolation, making the adoption of a sound policy imperative. [[handwritten]]Despite this necessity [[/handwritten]] In spite of this fact, our policy and our methods of determining it have remained unchanged. 
On July 30, 1909, when Mr. Orville Wright completed the final official acceptance tests for the delivery of an airplane to the United States Army, the first ever purchased by any nation in the world for military purposes, air power was introduced as a new element to be considered in our scheme of National Defense. Before this, the only considerations had been the Army and the Navy, and all plans for the defense of the country were based upon the strategy and tactics of those arms. 
While it was admitted that the airplane might prove of some value to both the Army and Navy for observation purposes, no one, except those intimately connected with its development, had the breadth of vision to realize its possibilities. However, within five years, the World War forced the most skeptical to realize its great importance. Used first

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