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of the defensive may be put to its proper use, for a limited time and a clearly defined ultimate offensive aim. Inferior forces of excellent morale may thus easily fix superior forces of the enemy for the time needed for the vital blow. This demands a proper economy of one's forces. One saves almost parsimoniously on the secondary issues, detaching the bare essentials only, in order that the all important blow may not lack in fulness of strength. For it, one spends with a lavish hand. 
To obtain this "economy of forces," there must be knowledge of the enemy's strength and dispositions. Were these fully known, the formulation of a good plan would require little more than good staff training and mediocre talents. It is precisely this information however that is the most difficult of the many difficult things to secure in war. Writers have often spoken of the "fog of war" -- an expressive phrase -- that truth fully pictures the uncertainty that accompanies war. Indeed few things in war are certain. "Sa sacree Majeste, l'hasard," as Frederick observed, will always have her share in the discussion. Since the dawn of history, vacillation has been the chief curse of captains; he who is unwilling to cast the die had best not undertake leadership in war. Necessarily much will always remain unknown, and must needs be left to change. That captain is most philosophical who while leaving as little as possible to chance, leaves 

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