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TALE SPINS   October 15, 1919

The Air Service at the Argonne-Meuse 

The Preparations for the Battle. - Moving from St. Mihiel to the Argonne. - The German Tactics. - A German Airplane Over General Pershing's Headquarters. - The Battle

By BRIG-GEN. WILLIAM MITCHELL, D.S.C,. D.S.M., Com. L.H., C.G., C.M.G.
Formerly Commander of the Air Service First Army, Group of Armies, and Army of Occupation, A.E.F.

COURTESY OF GENERAL MITCHELL AND WORLD'S WORK

[[image - photograph of General Mitchell]]
[[caption]] BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM MITCHELL [[/caption]]

The Saint Mihiel battle had been brought to a successful termination. Fifteen thousand German and Austrian prisoners filled our temporary detention camps. Cannon, transport, and booty of all kinds were brought in from every side. Our losses had been almost negligible, both in the air and on the ground, because we had taken the Germans by surprise. Not that they were fooled about where our attack would take place, but they were completely bewildered as to the exact time and method. They thought that we would be several days later, but, so rapid had been our concentration and so effectually had we kept them out of the air, that their ordinary information system was behind time in its operations. 

Our new army had worked very well on its first trial; now it was up to us to hit the Germans at their vital point - the Argonne-Meuse front. It involved of from sixty to one hundred miles in a straight line. All moves had to be made under cover of night by the infantry and artillery, while the airplanes moved either very early in the morning or just at evening to conceal themselves. 

Nothing approaching the size of the American First Army had ever operated in the Verdun area, and there were grave fears that this force could not possibly be supplied. Our staff was so confident that it could be supplied that they proposed attacking within a week after the conclusion of the operations at Saint Mihiel. 

Under these conditions, it is not difficult to see what a problem confronted the Air Service. An entire new set of airdromes had to be built,in very rough and uneven ground; all the hangers moved and erected; a complete new telephone system of hundreds of miles of wire for the Air Service alon installed, and a complete new change of base made. For instance, every group of airplanes consumed an average of 1,500 gallons of gasoline and 400 gallons of oil per day, while each bombardment group dropped five tons of bombs. This whole move was so arranged by the Air Service that, first, an air barrage was kept up to prevent hostile reconnaissance, both by day and night. In the latter case, the anti-aircraft artillery and searchlights were carefully disposed along the usual routes of enemy night reconnaissance. Then, our air reconnaissance of the enemy back area was pushed with greatest vigor in combination with the air services of the armies on both our flanks. 

Above all, we had to maintain as much secrecy as possible in the move. Artificial or camouflage hangers and airplanes had been constructed and set up on many of the new fields that we intended to occupy. Our construction squadrons took these down and erected the real hangers during the night, so that no difference would be apparent during the day from above. To make the deception as complete as possible, we feigned an attack on the Metz. We talked guardedly about it to the men who, of course, passed it on confidentially from one to the other. Our long range artillery shot at the fronts of the Metz; our bombardment airplanes attacked the railway station and all their depots of supplies there, while farther away to the east we sent day bombardment and pursuit air groups as far east as Chateau Salins. 

An amusing incident occured in connection with our air demonstration in front of the French Eighth Army. For all but the first few months of the war, their front had been very quiet-nothing more than a small trench raid or the pushing of air reconnaissance had taken place. Now the Germans made raids every night; air fighting went on at a great rate with every appearance that the attack was to take place there. The commander of that army became so alarmed over the prospect that he protested to French General Headquarters against the air demonstrations, because his army had been so depleted in personnel that he would be unable to resist a heavy counter-attack of the Germans which was, he believed, about to be delivered. 

The result of all these feints was to cause a great deal of uneasiness on the part of the Germans. Their troops were marched back and forth to points that they believed were threatened. We had completely taken over the "power of initiative"; they were on the defensive and had to wait for us to attack. There was one decided thing they did do, however. They well knew that we were going to hit in the direction of Treves Gap, somewhere east of the Argonne. Their air service could cover this whole area from a central point, and, in addition, act against the flank of the French Fourth Army west of the Argonne Forest, in the Champagne. Furthermore, to an army on the defensive or retreating, an air service is of the greatest use because it is the only branch that may seize the offensive and hold it against advancing enemy troops that necessarily have to use the roads in going forward. Also the faster an army advances, particularly in a rough and shell-torn country, such as this area was, the harder it is for the pursuer to build his airdromes and keep his aviation up with his troops. The amount of fuel that our airplanes could carry was little more than for two hours. If our airdromes were an hour's flight from the lines and an hour back, we could do nothing, whereas they, on the defensive, would be falling back on their own airdromes and consequently be getting nearer and nearer to them. Therefore, the Germans decided to concentrate the bulk of their whole aviation against our front. 

From our estimate of the situation we had considered

[[image - map of St. Mihiel and the Argonne]]

[[caption]] ST. MIHIEL AND THE ARGONNE
After the successful attack on the St. Mihiel salient the activities of the Americans were transferred to the Argonne. In the first battle the American air forces held an advantage because of their ability to fight on the outside of the salient, into which the Germans had come to defend themselves. But as the battle of the Argonne progressed the American planes found themselves in a growing salient, and they were handicapped accordingly. [[/caption]]

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