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18 TALE SPINS October 15, 1919 The Air Service on the Argonne-Meuse (Continued from Page 9) mere fact of subjecting it to artillery fire and battle conditions piled the trees on each other so that they, in themselves, made a very formidable obstacle. From the Argonne Forest to the Meuse River (a distance of about forty miles) there were many little forests covering a succession of ridges running more of less parallel to our front, all converging on the town and position of Mountfaucon, which was the Gibraltar of this part of the country. The German Positions Not only were the positions for defense very well concealed on the German side, but also their machine guns and artillery could be easily placed to enfilade and take in flank all advances which our troops made. From the heights east of the Meuse River, their artillery could be very easily concealed in the woods to fire against our right flank. Our corps, observation squadrons, protected by pursuit details, photographed and joined up the reconnaissance of the whole front so as to give all the information possible about the country to the ground troops. These photos consisted not only of views taken vertically from the usual altitude of 10,00 feet, but also of oblique views taken of the positions immediately in from of the troops at very low altitudes. The average man does not get much out of a vertical photo until he becomes expert in the art of interpreting them, but, on the other hand, an oblique view is easily understood because it looks like the view he has been used to from the top of a high mountain at the valley below. He easily appreciates the perspective. Ordinarly [[Ordinarily]] about eighty copies of each photo were required in active operations, and the photographic section worked night and day turning out from 2,500 to 3,500 prints per day for their respective army corps. Every opportunity was taken to make the ground troops familiar with the air units with which they had to work. This is always a very difficult thing to do, but we were making constant progress and developing additional cooperation every day. From our studies of the roads and communications behind the front of our army, which in the Argonne-Meuse district were very few and bad, we had noticed particularly the lack of roads behind our centre. We always watch these things carefully because, if a tieup or congestion in traffic occurs on a road where hundreds of motor trucks cannot move forward or backward, attack and bombardment aviation has its greatest opportunity. The German System of Attack. The Germans had recently systematized their attack methods of aviation-that is, the aviation which specializes in attacking troops and formations on the ground. They called this branch of aviation "battle squadron," gave them special airplanes and an especial manner of operating. To counteract these, we organized a special branch of our pursuit aviation which we called "low flying pursuit." The patrols of this branch each had ten kilometers [[kilometres]]or six miles of front assigned. They operated in two tiers, at about 200 and 600 to 800 feet respectively. The lower patrols contained two planes, the upper ones three. They kept very close liaison with the anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns. The enemy usually attacked in a succession of battle flights of from four to six planes each. Our low flying pursuit planes were seldom able to see them, because the enemy flew so close to the ground. The anti-aircraft artillery, however, could spot them with facility, and their fire would immediately call the attention of the low flying pursuit, which, from its method of operation, would usually bring from seven to nine pursuit ships against a single battle flight of the enemy. The pursuit group which handled the low fling pursuit shot down 110 German ships, and lost only 10 of their own in the month of October. No other aviation specialized in this as ours did, on account of the difficulty and danger of operation. Concentration of Air Forces. Having provided to the greatest extent possible for the aviation directly attacked to the troops, and the pursuit aviation for their protection, we decided to concentrate the mass of our bombardment and ground attack aviation on the main axis of our advance, so as to clear the way as much as possible for the infantry in its advance, and at the same time cover our dangerous centre from their attack. From the manner of the German air concentration against us and from their methods, which I had watched in the battle of Verdun in 1917, I was convinced that they would commence by operating against our flanks, and particularly against against our right flank on the first day, because they would think it possible that we would go in the direction of Metz. On the night preceeding [[preceding]] the attack with the opening of the preliminary artillery preparation, our night bombardment aviation made a simultaneous attack against their airdromes, railway stations, and principal depots of supplies and command, so as to destroy as much as possible, and at the same time interfere with their system of command. Before dawn on the day of the attack, all our aviation was in the air-the corps observation and low flying pursuit working directly with the troops themselves, the pursuit barrages at medium and high altitude guarding the front and particularly the flanks, while our bombardment aviation hit directly at the enemy elements on our main axis of advance. The First Day of The Attack. The effect on the enemy during the first day was staggering, as it always is when one has the power of initiative and makes a concentrated attack. Our artillery preparation was very well made, and the infantry advanced in a fine style. On the second day the advance was a little slower, and the enemy aviation made very sharp attacks against our flanks, and endeavored in every way to attack our infantry with their battle flights. These were sharply replied to by our low flying pursuits, and most of the fighting was carried into the enemy's country. The effect on the enemy during the first day was staggering, as it always is when one has the power of initiative and makes a concentrated attack. Our artillery preparations was very well made, and the infantry advanced in fine style. On the second day the advance was a little slower, and the enemy aviation made very sharp attacks against our flanks, and endeavored in every way to attack our infantry with their battle flights. These were sharply replied to by our low flying pursuit, and most of the fighting was carried into the enemy's country. The Germans, finding that their tactics did not make us spread a thin veneer of airplanes all along the front through which they could break easily at any point with large group formation, immediately formed into masses of more than from fifty to seventy pursuit ships, Fokkers, in a group. To make our infantry insist on a splitting up our pursuit aviation so as to give local protection everywhere, the Germans made the most desperate attacks against all our balloons and put an additional spur into their battle flights. Ae [[As]] we were on the offensive, most of the air fighting at altitude occurred on their side of the line. Our principle was always to have two pursuit and one bombardment group concentrate on a single point from different directions. Each group had nominally 100 airplanes out of which about sixty ships were usually available for duty. In order to protect themselves from the bombardment, they were forced to rise and accept combat with the result that a succession of great air battles took place. These were all to our advantage, until, as the Germans developed their whole strength, we were greatly outnumbered; but, with our system of concentration, were able to inflict much more loss than we received. Lastly, although still outnumbered, we had obtained the upper hand over them to such an extent that our units were always confident of attacking anything that showed up. After the second day of the attack, a very serious congestion of traffic took place behind our centre, that is, the road leading north Montfaucon, and, although there was some congestion in other places, it was worse in this area that I had ever seen on a battlefield. In addition, the troops immediately behind the front, being new at the game, built any number of fires in the woods which at once disclosed their positions. When I first saw it, it looked like the best target that I had ever seen for aviation on any field. The Germans, I knew, would not be slow to take advantage of it. For the next week, they made the most desperate efforts to get their aviation into effective operation both day and night against these elements of ours in and behind our centre army corps. We concentrated our aviation to protect it, and carried the fighting into their territory, with the result that, although they forced a few machines through from time to time, their formations were practically always broken up and badly mauled, particularly when they turned to go back as our concentration took place behind them. During the long forty-seven days of this battle, things such as I have mentioned above were of daily occurrence. A great deal of bad weather was encountered as there was hardly a day without either haze, mist, or rain. The bombardment kept on increasing in effect and importance. On one occasion, a heavy counter attack was being prepared by the Germans against the right of our line northeast of Verdun, at and near a place called Rambevillers. Troops, supplies, and all the necessary things for a determined counter-attack had been accumulated, and it waws about to start. To help us in holding up this attack, I requested the use of the bombardment aviation of the French Air Divisions, which was acceded to at once. Two formations of some 170 airplanes each, consisting of 3-seater bombardment Coudrons for protection of the flanks of the bombardment groups, with pursuit squadrons to attack the enemy pursuit, were sent, which combined with our units already acting against this position. The October day on which this this attack occurred was clear, and, as this great aerial armada went over the troops, at an altitude of about 15,000 feet, our men cheered them from the trenches, as it gave a feeling of power which could be felt in no other way. The Germans saw it coming, and massed all their units available to counteract it. The blow acme so swiftly, however, that they were able to make no effect on it. Not one of the Allied airplanes was lost or forced to land on the enemy side in this attack, while 12 enemy ships were shot down and destroyed, and many others driven down out of control. Thirty-nine tons of bomb were dropped in this one expedition, which, combined with thirty tons which our other units threw down during the rest of that day and the night, made a total of sixty-nine tons of bombs thrown down within the twenty-four hours which, I believe, is the greatest weight of aerial projectiles ever launched in one day on a battlefield. The impending German attack was entirely stopped it was indeed the dawn of the day when great forces will be capable of definitely effecting a group decision of the field of battle. In thinking back over various battle panoramas that I have seen from the air, and it must be remembered that from air one sees the whole thing on a clear day as it it were laid out on a table, my mind harks back to the last really great connected battle that I believe occurred on the Western front. It was the 14th day of October, as I remember it, that I was starting from my headquarters at Souilly to make my usual inspection and reconnaissance in the air. I had the reports from the French Fourth Army on our left that they had broken though the enemy line and were engaged in battle, at the same time that we were pushing along our entire front from the Argonne to the Meuse. Just as I was leaving I was asked very earnestly by a staff officer, who at a later date commanded
