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issued providing for the quickest possible assembling of these divisions at Dampvitoux St. Julien and Onville for conudting them into the sectors of the 77th Reserve and 10th Divisions.
    By a series of orders beginning August 25, all working forces, minenwerfer companies, pioneer companies, and gas projector companies available and the resting regi-ment of the 35th Austro-Hungarian Divisions were assigned to the Gorz Group to complete the construction if the line of artillery protect as quickly as possible, in order that the intented transfer of the main line of resistence to the line of artillery protection might be accomplished as soon as possible. At the same time other working forces, even sections of the resting battalions, were made available for the rearward positions. On September 9 orders were issued stopping all road and railroad construction and the construction of all dispensible railway track, the curtailment of all ammunition and supply depots and the removal of all ammunition still on the Cotes.
    On September 5 the Army sent its entire artillery reserve, in all 9 squadrons and 3 light batteries, into position behind the Gorz Group on a line with Thiaucourt in order to support that flank which was considered to be especially endangered. On September 8, after a considerable number of reinforcement batteries, especially of heavy artillery, had been promised, but before they had arrived, an order was issued (Order No. 2728 secret) for the withdrawal of all unmounted heavy batteries behind the «Michel» position. At the same time it was ordered that the unmounted 5th and 6th guns of the field artillery be taken away from the center divisions which had long marching routes and be assigned to the flank divisions which had the short marching routes. 
     On September 7 it was tentatively decided, upon recommendation of the Army Group, to shatter the enemy's offensive preparations by an attack with limited objectives upon the southern front. At that time it was ordered that the work of removal be continued on the western front and temporarily stopped (field railroads) only on the southern front. The plan of attack was worked out in a conference with the Army Group at Montmedy on September 9, but was abandoned because a highly important change in the situation had occurred in the meantime-the probability of a simultaneous hostile attack against the western front of Army Detachment «C» had increased materially. It was decided to obtain an order from the Higher Command for the immediate starting of the «Michel» movement (withdrawal to the «Michel» position).
     Already on September 10, even before the order was received from the Army Group, the work of removal and destruction was ordered to commence (in a conference of commanding officers), so that this work was in full progress when the order of the Army Group and the decision of the Higher Command arrived. On the same day request was made by telegraph for reinforcements considered necessary. On the evening of September 9 the telegraph for reinforcements considered necessary. On the evening of September 9 the Gorz Group reported that all preparations had progressed so far that the main line of resistance could be transferred back to the line of artillery protection on the night of September 11-12. Army Headquarters gave its approval and stipulated that the movement, which had been in preparation for weeks, should be completed by 4 a.m., September 12.
    Thus on the morning of September 12 the work of removal and destruction has in full progress. Some of the unmounted batteries had already been withdrawn (Mihiel Group) and the others were to be withdrawn that night. The Gorz Group was engaged in moving back its main line of resistance. The available counter-attack divisions were so placed that they could be used either on the western or southern front. 
     This was the situation when the enemy's attack struck the Army Detachment by surprise on the night of September 11-12. 
The Commanding General.
(Signed) FUCHS, Lieutenant General.
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[[on the left side]] Army Detachment «C».  [[on the right side]]Army Headquarters, September 19, 1918
Chief of General Staff.
   No. 2986. Secret

Pursuant to verbal order of the Army Group, September 18.
EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 12
     At 2 o'clock on the morning of September 12 very heavy artillery fire commenced along the entire Army front. Although the reserves of the Higher Command had not yet been made available-in spite of several requests-the 31st and 123d Divisions were alerted at 2.30 a.m. and the 88th Division at 2.50 a.m. As it became more and more certain that the expected large scale attack had begun and as the situation, therefore, did not permit waiting for the approval of the Higher Command but demanded an immediate and independent decision, the 31st and 123d Divisions were assembled at Dampvitoux and Onville. The 31st Division was sent forward to Zammes at 6.45 a.m., while the most advanced regiment of the 123d Division, which was already at Onville at 4.15 a.m., was sent to La Grande en Haye Farm at 5.45 a.m.; therefore, before the attack. At 8.15 a.m. the Commanding