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The CHAIRMAN. And we will be convicted again unless we were to very promptly make some report which will be convincing to the Congress, for otherwise we will again fail this year to get the needed money.

Senator WHITE. It is difficult to get an appropriation when you have a department which is insisting it does not want the appropriation and will not use it.

Colonel HARTNEY. You see, Senator, this is a certain school of navigation. There are three other schools that I have been contending should be considered and that we should get from them certain little things that would not cost very much and would be very helpful.

Mr. GORRELL. And we have now asked for it.

Colonel HARTNEY. Then there is one where they have now directed beams. They are not radio ranges at all. My contention is that we should do something about them.

Mr. GORRELL. All of this would be highly desirable.

Senator WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I must go now, if you will excuse me.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator White. When we recess we will recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. GORRELL. Referring to what has just been said about these other systems, probably you could not use them on these courses because the facilities on the ground do not exist. If we had direction finding from the air, under adverse weather we are accurate on shots up to only about 100 miles. Many range facilities are farther away. But additional ranges could be built, and should be built. Yet they do not exist today.

Colonel HARTNEY. With the expenditure of a couple of hundred dollars at each of these stations, they could have it on the ground.

The CHAIRMAN. What could you have for a couple of hundred dollars?

Mr. HARTNEY. It is a small radio compass built in addition to what they no whave, to enable you to locate the bearing of a plane from that station.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Gorrell, in your opinion, the first cause of this accident is the one which I have in my classification as no. 2, insufficient weather reporting?

Mr. GORRELL. No, sir. The first cause is your classification no. 1, lack of facilities to transmit the weather.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you think no. 1 is the lack of facilities to transmit the weather?

Mr. GORRELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the next factor is my classification no. 2.

Mr. GORRELL. Lack of weather information.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other important factor?

Mr. GORRELL. The third factor, if I should pick a third one, would be lack of ability to receive and send, because for some reason, either be lack of ability to send, because for some reason, statis or lack of volume of the aid on the ground--and personally I do not know which--would not permit the pilot to hear. There ---- this lack of ability to send.

The CHAIRMAN. You make this statement, however, that that particular line has taken advantage of discovery and invention and progress as far as the development of the science is concerned and is up to date.

Mr. GORRELL. I do; and that is proven by the fact that they have flown the same course 10 years and never hurt a person prior to this accident.

The CHAIRMAN. I am impressed with this: Isn't there a strong probability that something was wrong with the radio on the plane? I am not suggesting that this was due to any fault of the air line, but perhaps simply due to lack of progress in the art.

Mr. GORRELL. I mentioned a while ago that static does interfere with reception, and we seemingly are in a transition period at the present moment, of being able to go to where static has not the power to interfere, where rain and snow and hail will not interfere--at least not so much--with reception.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us bring in another factor. Did this pilot use good judgement? He conversed with Pilot James, and he believed when he got beyond a certain point he would be in good weather, but when he found himself in bad weather was there a failure of judgement on his part as to what he should have done?

Mr. GORRELL. That is pretty hard to say, because we have not found the plane. To answer your question I would have to make a guess. My guess is that when he found himself in bad weather he was faced with the problem of getting down. He had information in his possession that the ceiling was better at Salt Lake City than it might have been at some other spot. He was probably faced with the undesirable fact of landing at the emergency field at Delta, so that with clear weather predicted ahead it is possible that he thought the unexpected weather might have been a small temporary situation, and he got into it unforeseen and unwarned, and then had to make up his mind what he would do--go through it or land; and if he should land, where?

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't that something like the Cutting accident? This man, when he took the Burlington route, had knowledge in his possession that he had 1,200 feet of ceiling and he came down thinking he was coming into clear weather, but did not find it. I suppose a similar thing occurred here. He had notice of 1,200 feet, or what was it here?

Mr. GORRELL. Eight thousand feet at Salt Lake City.

The CHAIRMAN. And he had the right, I suppose, to think if he came down he would come into clear weather, but apparently did not.

Mr. GORRELL. It is possible and quite likely that he did come into clear weather for a while, and then the weather closed in on him. I mean while he was in that clear weather, and unexpectedly. And he was not aware of the fact that the ceiling had fallen ahead of him. Going into unexpected weather he may have thought it only a temporary situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the ground aids fully installed at Milford?

Mr. GORRELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And weather reporting, too?

Mr. GORRELL. I have that on my other maps, but I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you fill that in?

Mr. GORRELL. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us assume for the moment that Milford was equipped. He went on and when he came to Delta--was it a fully equipped station?

Mr. GORRELL. It is not.

The CHAIRMAN. It is incomplete?

Mr. GORRELL. There is no radio facility there at all. It is a purely emergency field, and one is being built.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, provision is being made for radio equipment?

Mr. GORRELL. Radio can be installed, but no money has been assigned for that point.

The CHAIRMAN. And no weather reports are made from there?

Mr. GORRELL. Weather reporting is not possible of quick transmission from there.

The CHAIRMAN. We go north to Boulder Pass. What is the situation there as regards ground aids?

Mr. GORRELL. None exists. They have been requested, but none have been installed.

The CHAIRMAN. We will now recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1 p.m., the subcommittee recessed until 2 p.m. of the same date.)

AFTER RECESS
The committee resumed its session at 2 p.m.

STATEMENT OF EDGAR S. GORRELL--Continued

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Gorrell, you appeared before this committee some time last spring. Afterward I discussed with you the details of how $5,000,000 might be spent by the Government, although I was fully convinced that that would not be half enough. Indeed, it is probable that if all the ground aids were installed which should be installed, the cost would be something like $15,000,000.
On April 8, Colonel Gorrell, you and I appeared before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate. In the record of that hearing on H.R. 12098, the State, Justice, Commerce, and Labor appropriation bill for 1937, at page 79, we find a report headed:
Proposed projects on which agreement as to need was reached by representatives of the Bureau of Air Commerce, Air Transport Association of America, Senate Subcommittee on Aircraft Investigation - arranged in order of their relative importance.
This summary, amounting in all to an appropriation of $5,000,000, is as follows: