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21 HP Present by invitation of accident board: P. H. Brattain, assistant general manager; C. Froesch, engineer; D. C. McRae, radio engineer; B. Griffith, director of public relations; C. W. Hicks, radio research department of Bendix Aviation Corporation; C. N. Scully, field manager at Newark Airport for Eastern Air Lines; G.B. Brophy of counsel. Crew on plane: H.T. Merrill, captain of plane; J.A. Batlle, Pilot of Plane; J.D. Sisson, flight steward on plane. Passengers on plane: V. Lebow, 3206 Hilton Street, Baltimore, Md.; W.T.S. Critchfield, 75 Norwood Avenue, Summit, N.J.; Sam Saggio, Meker Place, Mill- born, N.J.; R.V. Lake, 123 Ocean Avenue, Woodmere, Long Island; Hubert A. Hall, Haskins & Sells, Barnett National Bank Building, Jacksonville, Fla.; E. Sperber, 170 Peerton Street, West Palm Beach, Fla.; Sam S. Alexander, Alexander Oil Co., 1000 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y.; P. Blomquist, Eastern Air Lines, 1775 Broadway, New York, N.Y. Injured: Capt. H. T. Merrill; Pilot J. A. Batlle; Sam Saggio, passenger. Witnesses: H.T. Merrill, captain of plane; J.A. Batlle, pilot of plane; W.L. Warren, meteorologist; R.B. Rothrock, dispatcher, J.D. Sisson, flight steward on plane; P. Blomquist, passenger; H. Leatherman, radio operator. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY According to the testimony presented at the hearing, the plane in question was operated as trip 14 from Miami to New York, on December 19, 1936. It departed from Miami, on schedule, at 1 p. m. after proper clearance. The flight proceeded normally to Charleston, S.C. It departed from Charleston at 5:25 p. m. with a clearance to Camden with alternate fields at Newark and Boston. The clearance was issued by Dispatcher Rothrock from Newark at 4:57 p. m. and before departure the plane's tanks were filled with 510 gallons of gasoline and 34 gallons of oil in compliance with the clearance. The flight proceeded on instruments after leaving Charleston and was definitely on course over Raleigh at 6:32 p. m. when it passed over the cone of silence on the Raleigh radio range. It passed over the cone of silence at Richmond at 7:12 p. m. and over Washington at 7:39 p. m., being definitely on course over those points. The flight plan from Washington to Newark was radioed by Captain Merrill to the company station at Newark at 7:44 p. m. after passing over Washington. The flight plan indicated that the plane would fly at 5,000 feet and would reach Camden 45 minutes after passing Washington. At 7:49 p. m., Captain Merill reported to Newark that his flying time from Washington to Newark would be 1 hour and 15 minutes. This made his scheduled arrival at Newark at 8:54 p. m. The plane continued on its course out of Washington on the northeast leg of the Washington beam but on nearing Baltimore difficulty was encountered in receiving signals from this beam due to a bad static condition caused by heavy rain squalls. Captain Merrill continued flying northeast on a compass course of 60 degrees and passed over Baltimore at approximately 7:57 p. m. Baltimore was identified by the glow of lights appearing through the overcast. After passing Baltimore the air became very rough. An effort was made to pick up the southwest leg of the Camden beam but without success due to static conditions. At 8:06 p. m. Dispatcher Rothrock instructed Captain Merrill to land at Camden and discharge a Washington passenger and cargo. The plane answered at 8:10 p. m., reported on instruments at 4,000 feet and stated that it was proceeding on to Newark as it had a motor that was "very rough." The plane continued to fly a course of 60° until a lapse of 45 minutes from Washington. At this time Captain Merrill, still being unable to receive radio range signals, changed the compass course to 90° and descent was started. During descent an effort was made to tune in on the Newark beam but without success. At 8:25 p. m. a contact was established with the plane which reported that it was unable to determine whether it passed over Camden; it requested clearance and Newark weather. The company station at Newark gave the ship the Kollsman barometer reading and requested the ship to stand by for clearance and weather. At 8:28 p. m. the company station at Newark advised the plane that no other planes were ahead of it and that Newark weather was 1,000 feet, overcast, 5 miles visibility, light rain, light fog, wind east, variable to the northeast with gusts up to 30 miles per hour. The ship did not answer this report and was called again by the ground station at 8:40 p. m. but no response was received. The last completed contact with the ship was made at 8:25 p. m. The testimony of Captain Merrill shows that after changing to a 90° course he descended to an altitude of 2,500 feet. He noted a glow of lights and immediately leveled off. He then changed the course back to 60° and within a few minutes saw more lights. The propellers were then put into low pitch, slowing the ship down to 100 to 110 miles per hour air speed. Captain Merrill then started mushing down. More lights were seen on lowering to an altitude of 2,000 feet, but within a few moments the plane was again in clouds. It continued to mush down on instruments. At an altitude of approximately 1,400 feet the ship contacted a tree with its right wing. The pilot at first thought the jar was caused by some mechanical difficulty with the motor. Within a moment another tree was encountered and he realized that he was going to crash. Captain Merrill reduced the speed to a point sufficient to keep the nose of the ship up while making a landing. Before the ship came to a stop, Captain Merrill cut off the master switch and the battery switch. The ship came to a stop about 408 feet from the point of the first contact with a tree. The ship landed in the vicinity of Port Jervis, N.Y., at 8:47 p. m. The testimony shows that adequate steps were then taken to notify Eastern Air Lines and summon aid for the passengers and crew. Captain Merrill reports that the lights which were seen before the ship came in contact with the first tree led him to believe that he was in the vicinity of Princeton or Trenton in view of the compass course which he was flying. The clearance issued to Captain Merrill, at Charleston, indicated that would have a strong south to southwest wind up to the vicinity of Washington or Baltimore and from there on up there would be some southwest and south winds above an altitude of 5,000 feet. Below that altitude it would be fresh to strong southeast to east winds. The term "fresh to strong" indicates a wind velocity up to 35 or 45 miles per hour. The testimony indicates that all Department of Commerce weather sequences were received by the ship up to the time static conditions were encountered in the vicinity of Baltimore; that is, up to approximately 7:57 p. m. From the departure at Charleston to this time these sequences would be as follows: 5:41 p. m., 6:41 p. m., and 7:41 p. m. The broadcasts were made some minutes after each period. Exhibit no. 6 introduced into the record contains all Department of Commerce weather sequences along the route issued from 1:41 p. m. on December 19, 1936, to 10:41 p. m. The 5:41 p. m. sequence indicates at Baltimore an east wind with a velocity of 9 miles per hour; at Wilmington an east wind with a velocity of 25 miles per hour; at Camden an east-southeast wind with a velocity of 21 miles per hours; at Trenton an east wind with a velocity of 20 miles per hour, and at Newark an east wind with a velocity of 11 miles per hour. The 6:41 p. m. sequence shows at Baltimore a northeast wind of 8 miles per hour; at Wilmington a northeast wind of 14 miles per hour; at Camden an east southeast wind of 19 miles per hour, and at Newark an east wind of 9 miles per hour. The 7:41 p. m. sequence shows at Baltimore a northeast wind of 7 miles per hour; at Wilmington a southeast wind of 24 miles per hour; at Camden an east-southeast wind of 18 miles per hour; at Trenton an east wind of 21 miles per hour, and at Newark an east-northeast wind of 11 miles per hour. The 8:41 p. m. sequence shows Baltimore a northeast wind of 9 miles per hour; at Wilmington a southeast wind of 9 miles per hour. It shows no wind direction or velocity for Camden or Trenton and at Newark it shows an east wind of 10 miles per hour. The sequences at 9:41 p. m. and 10:41 p. m. show a substantial increase in wind velocity from Wilmington to Newark. The 9:41 p. m. sequence shows wind at Wilmington to be southeast, with a velocity of 22 miles per hour; at Camden, east-southeast, 36 miles per hour; at Trenton, east, 22 miles per hour; at Newark, east, 10 miles per hour. The 10:41 p. m. sequence shows Wilmington wind direction as southeast, 18 miles per hour; Camden, east-southeast, 37 miles per hour; Trenton, east-southeast, 30 miles per hour; Newark, east 27 miles per hour. The testimony of W. L. Warren, meteorologist, indicates that the velocity of the wind, from Baltimore north at the time when the ship was in that territory was substantially greater than that reported. He testified that the velocity must have been from 70 to 75 to 90 or 95 miles per hour. He further testified that on the next day the balloon soundings at Newark showed wind velocity to be 78 miles per hour at 2,000 feet. Exhibits nos. 1, 2, and 3 introduced at the bearing show the various checks made upon the plane, engines, and equipment in accordance with company regulations. FINDINGS On the basis of the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing the accident board finds: 1. The airplane, motors, instruments, radio, and all accessories were in proper working condition at the time of departure from Miami and continued to function properly up to the time of the accident. 2. The plane was properly cleared from Charleston to Camden, with alternate landing fields at Newark and Boston, under the regulations of the Department of Commerce and the company. 3. All rules and regulations of the Department of Commerce and the company were complied with during the entire course of the flight. 4. After passing Baltimore static conditions made reception of the Camden and Newark radio beams impossible. 5. After passing Baltimore the plane proceeded on a more westerly course than that indicated by compass readings. 6. The course actually flown by the plane resulted from the presence of a higher wind velocity than that reported to the pilot in the clearance and in the weather sequences furnished during the flight. 7. The flying crew could not have determined the wind velocity which resulted in a course more westerly than the compass readings. 8. The combination of heavy static due to unusual weather conditions, plus easterly winds of hurricane velocity, were responsible for the flying crew's uncertainty of the position of the ship and being off course. 9. That Capt. Dick Merrill and Pilot John Battle were not responsible for the loss of DC-2 plane, transport license no. NC-13732, Eastern Air Lines No. 322, the night of December 19, 1936, due to conditions being beyond their control, as listed above. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. That a more thorough radio course be prepared and that all flying personnel be instructed and checked. 2. That a more thorough course on weather be prepared and all flying personnel instructed in its use. 3. That all flying personnel make as much use of the radio aids in good weather as in bad. 4. That all dispatching, weather, and radio personnel and superintendents exercise the greatest possible caution with more accuracy in forecasts and judgment if possible, regardless of weather conditions. 5. That a set of recommendations for greater safety and precision in operation be composed by a committee consisting of not less than three pilots, two weathermen, two dispatchers, one radio engineer, operations manager, and general manager, which, in turn, will be submitted for criticism to all flying, weather, dispatching, and radio personnel for criticism and recommendation. Upon receipt of the criticisms and recommendations, this committee will compose a new set of limitations to be put into effect immediately. 6. That continued effort be put forth by the management to secure TL antennae at all radio-range stations on Eastern Air Lines system, and to add additional stations where needed.
