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all designed to state that America, because of untimely pride, refused to manufacture airplanes of British and French design and to profit by the experience accumulated by the British and French prior to America's entry into the World War.  Says this great British leader, (whose memoirs, valuable and thrilling as they are, might have been closer to the truth had he confined his criticisms to British matters, with which he was probably familiar), "They" (the Americans) "considered that it would be a reflection upon American inventiveness and ingenuity merely to keep to European patterns" (of airplanes). "They must have something and original to send to Europe."

Apparently, forgetful of even the conferences in which he personally participated, forgetful of the fact that the fundamentals of America's aeronautical policy in Europe was compiled in collaboration with Britishers designated by and represent Lloyd George, forgetful of the fact that America's aeronautical policy was restricted by the scarcity of ocean tonnage, as well based upon other factors with which the British, in collaboration with Americans, agreed in absolute harmony of thought, Lloyd George terminates the aforementioned reference by the sneering statement, "When the Armistice was signed, November 11th, half the airplanes used by the American army were of French and British make." (Incidentally, very few were British; see infra.) The situation upon which Lloyd George so forgetfully comments was as much the conception of him and his staff, as it was of the Americans. Also, it is a fact that had British information concerning the usefulness of bombardment airplanes not been so incorrect both in the Spring and June of 1917, greater destruction from the air by American built airplanes would have been visited upon the enemy's resources.

Some day, perhaps the millennium will arrive when human beings may then ultimately realize the desirability of confining their historical remarks, written for the benefit of posterity, to facts with which they were and still remain familiar. Due to their gripping interest, the world will not fail to study the war memoirs of David Lloyd George but likewise the world should not fail to understand that unfortunately this great allied leader, to whom the Allies are so deeply indebted, has unfortunately gone so far afield in his fascinating survey of the allied situation that some of the momentous events are portrayed by him in a manner that does not bear the scrutiny of intelligent research and mature consideration. In this article, I shall try to present to the impartial reader, the situation as it actually did occur in regards to America's war time aircraft program.

Previous to entering the war, the united states lacked both experiences