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13

Maximum Satellite translation was stopped when it was in the RMS wrist camera field-of-view for the grapple attempt. 

Parking the satellite over the bay for the RMS attempts with a satellite of this size while rotating, and even tumbling as it was on the first attempt, was not considered a problem.

EVA

Prebreath: The prebreath and cabin depress to 10.2 psi was performed twice due to a crew procedural error. This posed no problem since there was adequate Nitrogen (N2) on board. 

Pre-and Post: EVA pre- and post-operations were performed with the integrated flight specific and generic EVA Checklists. All operations went nominally. Prior to EVA 2, the EMU water servicing was done serially to avoid stressing the remaining WCS fan/separator. Stowage was well planned and helped in organizing a large amount of equipment. The airlock needed more velcro to temporarily stow tools during airlock ops and ingress/egress(R).

EMU Performance: EMU radio frequency (RF) communication (comm) in the airlock was very noisy. Hardline comm was used except for comm checks with the ground and flight deck. The noise was of three kinds: (1) scratch, due to contact of the EMU with the airlock adapter plates (AAPs), (2) squeal, likely due to a broken antenna cable on EMU 1, and (3) static from an undetermined source. In the payload bay (PLB), the static was very objectionable during EVA 1. During EVA 2, the static was not as noticeable. This may have been the result of extravehicular (EV) 1 and 2 swapping comm modes although the static did not return when EV1 and 2 returned to their original comm modes to try to increase EV 1's volume level. The volume did not increase due to the broken cable on EMU 1. The flight deck received the EVA crewmen at a much higher volume than they received the ground. 

EMU 2 functioned flawlessly throughout both EVAs. EMU 1 had one major problem besides the broken antenna cable. On EMU 1, the sublimator pressure would not hold below the caution and warning level unless the Temp Control Valve was set to the max cold position. The first caution and warning (CW) alarm occurred at airlock egress. During EVA 1, the water (H2O) valve was turned off for the entire EVA. During EVA 2, it was empirically found that the pressure would hold at maximum cold. A water switch cycle of approximately 1 hour OFF and 1 to 2 minutes ON maintained a marginal comfort level. There was some fogging in the helmet due to the elevated temperature in the EMU. The maximum sublimator pressure seen on EMU 1 was about 8.5 psi. The sublimator problem should be resolved prior to the next EVA flight (R).

EV 1 experienced a failure in a urine collection device (UCD) during EVA 2, resulting in a sizable amount of urine free in the EMU. The liquid cooling and ventilation garment (LCVG) soaked up the liquid so that none of it reached the vent loop. The EMU Oxygen (O2) flow and LiOH/Charcoal cartridge were sufficient to remove most of the odor from the suit. The major difficulty was in the postflight cleanup. If the failure had occurred on EVA 1, EMU 3 may have been required. The UCD should be made completely reliable(R).  

Transcription Notes:
Third paragraph needs subscript for (N2). *I think N2 and H2O and O2 are fine.