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14

The shoulder joints of EMU 1 were noticeably stiffer on orbgit than in the water environment test facility (WETF).  The effect had been observed in thermal vaccum testing at the Space Environmental Simulation Laboratory (SESL).

Payload Bay Equipment/Configuration:  Equipment designed for EVA should be built with enough slope and tolerance to make operation with a pressurized glove easy.  Example of equipment not built to correct tolerances for gloved operation are the safety tether retention snaps and MMU arm retention snaps.

The operational slidewires were launched with 1/3 of their specified tension.  They were too loose to be usable as translation aids.  Several frayed areas were present on the nylon cover of the port slidewire.  These appeared to be the results of launch vibrations rubbing the slidewire against the Orbiter structure.  in one spot, the cover was worn through and the resulting bunching up of the cover forced the EV crewmen to pull the safety tether manually over the area[[.]] The slidewires should be tensioned to their proper specification values (R).

As noted during STS 41-B, the safety tether had approximately twice the required tension on the take-up reel.  This pulle dthe crewman towards the slidewire with a force that was distracting and fatiguing.  This tension should be reduced (R).

The cargo bay stowage assembly (CBSA) operated nominally; much easier than in the Water Environmental Test Facility (WETF) trainer.  The mini-work station (MWS) end effector cable was broken on one unit while positioning the MWS.  One of the MWS bayonet-mount locks worked loose during EVA 2 resulting in the inadvertent jettison of the small trash bag.  These locks should be detented or made more secure some other way (R).  Securing two tool caddys with one lock on the MWS was another potential way to lose equipment.  

The PLB lights were adequate for general night operation in the PLB, but needed to be supplemented for operation at a work site.  The EMU helmet-mounted lights worked very well.  One light on each side was enough to fill in shadows on the Solar Maximum Satellite and illuminate all work areas during the night. 

The EVA power tool performed superbly and should be made part of the standard Shuttle Tool Kit, both EV and intravehicluar [[intra-vehicular]](IV) (R).  The gray tape carried in the CBSA for Orbiter  contingency operations will not work and should be replaced by the three-layer Kapton take used for the Solar Maximum Satellite repair (R).  The wrist tether used to secure the movable tripod foot restraint on the FSS had to be removed each time the foot restraint was adjusted.  A generic restraint that does not interfere with foot restraint operation should be used (R).  The pip pins used on the portable foot restraints (PFR) on the FSS are an example of a system that worked well.

The FSS locker port door would not fully open due to interference between a handrail on the door and a cable tray in the PLB.  The crew was unable to crew equipment interface test (CEIT) this item and had experienced the same problem in the WETF.

Both airlock hatches felt stiffer to close than int he trainers.  A harder pull was required to make the latches on both hatches.  All airlock operations were nominal.