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4. Secondary payloads and payload specialists should be stabilized at the L-5 month point to ensure that flight procedures, software, safety reviews, and crew training are available and can be accomplished according to plan without an unacceptable effort.

5. Late changes to a mission adversely impact training and procedure development for downstream missions.

6. There is no formal statement that authorizes NASA to audit a payload developer to assume compliance with NSTS payload safety requirements.

7. The normal payload safety process failed to identify potentially serious single point failures in the Centaur upper stage.

8. The operational Maintenance Inspection Program is immature and does not yet provide Level II with adequate closed loop oversite. It lacks a comprehensive system to track and audit compliance with established requirements.

Conclusion
1. An inspection and maintenance program should be implemented that will ensure flawless performance of critical Space Shuttle hardware into the 21st century.

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