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An overall view of the flight support process at JSC in January 1986, is one of a reduced capability in terms of qualified personnel, trying to deal with an increasing flight rate, a conversion to a production-oriented system, and a transition to a single operations support contractor. The result of this is a system which in some areas projected the use of all or almost all of its reserve capacity for 1986, indicating inability to meet required production schedules.

In order to develop a fully operational capability, a conscious effort must be made to constrain the flight rate within the capacity of the NSTS Program while maintaining reserve resources to develop this operational capability. Additionally, periodic plateaus in the flight rate would allow the system to assess its progress, make necessary adjustments, and make adequate plans for the next incremental increase. Initiatives such as these will allow an orderly transition to the operations era while maintaining the high quality of flight support which is critical to successful manned spaceflight operations.

In summary, the existing program commitments in January 1986 precluded devoting adequate resources to developing the capability to support an increasing flight rate.

3. Flight Operations Preparedness 

Since STS-1, there have been frequent occasions for the mission operations team conducting STS flights to call upon its diverse technical expertise to deal with significant problems in either Orbiter or payload systems. The record of STS flights to date shows that high levels of operations preparedness were demonstrated by the repeated ability of the mission operations team to conduct successful flights in spite of occasional major failures and anomalies (e.g., two general purpose computer (GPC) failures on STS-9, loss of control of the Solar Maximum Satellite on STS 41-C, dump nozzle freeze-ups on STS 41-D, and premature engine shutdown on STS 51-F). Flight operations preparedness is directly dependent on the quality of preflight training for mission operations personnel and, although it has been previously acknowledged that training requirements in 1986 and beyond were projected to exceed the capabilities of the system, no indication was found of a degradation in flight operations preparedness.

4. Range Safety Requirements 

As currently defined, the Range Safety responsibilities date back to the Webb-McNamara Agreement of 1963 giving responsibility for range safety during NASA flights to the Department of Defense (see app. A, "Range Safety Report"). 

The most fundamental issue remaining is the philosophical decision of whether to put a destruct system on a manned vehicle. This concept has been debated repeatedly over the years revolving around the tradeoff between voluntary and involuntary risk. The issue is out of

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