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10. Statistical weather and forecasting uncertainties have resulted in several weather waveoffs and dictate a need for multiple landing sites for end of mission.

11. The current landing and deceleration systems have not demonstrated an adequate margin for routine KSC and TAL abort operations.

12. The Astronaut Office plays a significant role in all activities associated with development, flight preparation, and flight execution, and they or their management are members of all major decision-making boards and panels.


8. Conclusions

1. The NSTS Program should make a conscious effort to constrain the flight rate within the capacity of the NSTS Program while maintaining reserve resources to develop a fully operational capability.

2. Accurate, localized weather forecast capability is needed before the Mission Operations Team relies on anything but overly conservative weather decisions.

3. The NSTS must maintain and be successful with its previous first stage design philosophy of ensuring first stage reliability through design and certification to preclude failures.

4. The NSTS Program should evaluate the options and utility of providing crew escape systems and augmenting Orbiter abort modes for failures such as loss of two SSME's.

5. NSTS Program need for KSC and landings related system performance criteria should be reevaluated; routing KSC landings should continue only after such reevaluation is complete and resultant criteria are satisfied.

6. KSC should continue to be supported as one of the alternate EOM landing locations.

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