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Station evolution and growth, and consequently for transportation capabilities as well. 

We must pursue a more deliberate program; this implies that we should avoid a "race to Mars." There is the very real danger that if the U.S. announces a human Mars initiative at this time, it could escalate into another space race. Whether such a race was real or perceived, there would be constant pressure to set a timetable, to accelerate it if possible, and to avoid falling behind. Schedule pressures, as the Rogers Commission noted, can have a very real, adverse effect. The pressure could make it difficult to design and implement a program which would have a strong foundation and adequate momentum to sustain itself beyond the first few piloted missions. This could turn an initiative that envisions the eventual development of a habitable outpost into another one-shot spectacular. Such a dead-end venture does not have the support of most NASA personnel. Neither, according to the National Commission on Space, does it have the support of the public. A "theme brought forward repeatedly" in the Commission's extensive public sessions was "a strong wish that our next goal for piloted space activity not be another Apollo -- a one-shot foray or a political stunt."

THE OFFICE OF EXPLORATION 

During the majority of this work, there was no focal point within NASA for studies on human exploration. Recognizing this deficiency, and adopting one of the early recommendations of this study, the NASA Administrator has established the Office of Exploration to fund, direct, and coordinate studies related to human exploration.
 
Both of the human exploration initiatives described in this work were generated in a workshop or task force environment. The three to four months devoted to their formulation were adequate only to develop the starting point for in-depth studies. The Office of Exploration will be responsible for coordinated mission studies to develop these and other scenarios, to assess mission concepts and schedules, and to study trade-offs in requirements, technology, transportation, and facilities utilization. Advanced technology and transportation requirements cannot be developed in a vacuum. These mission studies will provide a context for planning technology and transportation development and Space Station evolution (and studies in these areas will, of course, feed back into the mission scenarios). 

The establishment of the Office of Exploration was an important step. Adequate support of the Office will be equally important, and will be an indication of the commitment to long-term human exploration. There is some concern among observers that the Office was created only to placate critics, not to provide a serious focus for human exploration. Studies relating to human exploration of the Moon or Mars currently command only about .03 percent of NASA's budget (approximately 1 dollar out of 3000); this is not enough. 

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