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helicopter operations in the New York area for the past 10 years have demonstrated clearly the greater savings in time possible through air access into the inner city. The rush-hour bus schedules from Kennedy Airport to the East Side Terminal are based on 90-min travel time; Wall Street is at least 30 min from the East Side Terminal. The helicopter time, by contrast, from Kennedy Airport to the Wall Street Terminal is 7 min. Last year New York Airways carried over one-half-million passengers, continuing its consistent increased part in the local transportation market.

New York Airways is engaged in much pioneering work in the development of all-weather capability. The DECCA system is currently in use for precision short-range navigation, and pilots are undergoing instrument training. The necessary air-traffic-control procedures have been developed, and it is anticipated that regular instrument operations will be commenced shortly. It is ironic that all-weather reliability will have been achieved at a time when the end of federal subsidy creates doubt that helicopter operations can be extended.

To date, helicopter service in New York City has not been able to reach financial self-sufficiency. The most important reasons for this have been high initial aircraft investment, high operating and maintenance costs, and limited average daily utilization, as the table below indicates.

In view of the fact that the Congress this year terminated its operating subsidy to New York Airways, it is doubtful that this consistent past growth can be projected into the future, except in operations for which specific air-carrier support can be obtained. To date, the Civil Aeronautics Board has limited New York Airways' operations to service to and from the major airports of New York. The provision of service by helicopter without subsidy is even less likely from downtown terminals to points other than major New York airports.

So long as access to locations such as the Wall Street heliport and the Pan Am Building rooftop is required, the helicopter will have a place in metropolitan transportation systems for the foreseeable future. Only the helicopter can now land in such restricted space. Furthermore, only the helicopter can now take advantage of the special weather minimums and altitude-of-flight restrictions predicated on its low-flight capability and its ability to make emergency landings in the extremely small surfaces available in urban areas.

VTOL Designs Not Ready for Commercial Use. Of 11 VTOL aircraft designs for which the Department of Defense has contracted (not including helicopters), three are single-pilot fighter-bomber, trainer, or special-purpose aircraft whose function would not be remotely relevant to the commercial carriage of passengers. Two of the designs have been destroyed in accidents. The remainder are exotic in concept, are limited in range and payload, and embody complex electronic, hydraulic, and mechanical systems which, for commercial use, would appear to involve prohibitive costs of acquisition and operation, as well as questionable levels of reliability. In most cases, useful load would not exceed 30% of the maximum weight compared with 40% for helicopters and 50% for STOL aircraft. Admittedly, these 11 VTOLs may be refined; but there appears to be little doubt that the development required will be both lengthy and expensive. So it would appear that no commercial transportation system planned for the next decade should be predicated on the availability of VTOL designs.

Fixed-Wing Aircraft Capable of Providing Air Access to the Inner City. It is difficult to rationalize fully the preoccupation of the last decade with rotary-wing aircraft as a means of solving the downtown air-transportation problem. Fixed-wing, high-lift techniques are almost as old as aviation and have been successfully exploited in many aircraft types to achieve amazingly short landing and takeoff distances. Still-air landing and takeoff distances of less than 500 ft have been demonstrated in many aircraft types at least one of which is currently in regular transport service—a four-engine aircraft grossing 44,000 lb for 55 passengers.

The introduction of STOL aircraft will require landing strips 600 to 1000 ft long. This represents an increase in real estate over the requirements to accommodate a helicopter operation. However, where natural approaches exist, such as those afforded by rivers and harbors, and where property is available, such as the abandoned piers of the New York waterfront, the additional real-estate requirement may be regarded as modest.

By contrast with the helicopter and its more sophisticated fixed-wing relatives, the STOL aircraft is a model of structural and systems simplicity, is capable of extremely high reliability, and costs relatively little. For a comparable passenger 

DIRECT OPERATING COSTS (DOC)
Total DOC consists of (a) total depreciation and insurance costs of the complete aircraft (airframe, engine, propeller, radio and other equipment) (b) total overhaul and maintenance costs of the complete aircraft, and (c) total flying costs (crew's salaries and expenses, cost of fuel oil, etc.). Data either estimated or supplied by the manufacturer.
[---]
Aircraft | Single-engine airplane | Twin-engine airplane | Twin-engine helicopter |
[---]
Maximum weight, lb | 5288 | 10,000 | 19,000
Minimum crew | one | one | two
Annual utilization, hr | 1000 | 1000 | 1500
Stage distance, n. mi. | 100 | 100 | 25
Number of passengers𝛿 | 9 | 14 | 25
Total DOC, $/hr | 48.99 | 88.28 | 325.19
DOC/n. mi., ¢ | 42.25 | 68.17 | 297.00
DOC/passenger, n. mi., ¢ | 4.96 | 4.87 | 11.83
[---]
𝛿 Assuming 100% load factor.

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