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the system. This was a bold "set up" by the entire State, and to no one's amazement, one of the brothers who had been shot down was made to lie on the concrete without medical aid for over 15 minutes when the prison hospital was the next building to the yard. He bled to death. This most savage act was called "racial violence" by the prison officials. The only point the prison officials disregard is that they were the violent murderers.

THIS INCIDENT was the reinforcing stimulus, the showing of power, the "putting the niggers back in place;" it was the lynching. All acts inside the prison walls must be seen as reactions to the prison itself. The overt threat of prison (and the threat therein of being murdered if there is a sign of nonacceptance) is magnified by the murders, the iron hand was used that not even justice dared to show opposition to. Three days later, January 16, 1970, the Monterey Grand Jury made their announcement: the murder of three black prisoners was called justifiable homicide. The judicial aspect had failed to render justice, not because the facts were not present, but on the contrary, because the facts are that if action had been taken by the judicial aspect of society, it would have first had to break its own leg; it would have had to go straight to the Governor of California for a criminal indictment. But what did happen was the further conditioning of acceptance of the capitalist system, in that the response to the murdered brothers was everyone's looking up to the "Grand Jury" hoping that the upper class--or representatives of it--would act against other representatives of the upper class who acted in the latter's best interest.
  Thus we see the two specific social functions: prisons and the overt threat, and the judicial aspect of capitalist society as the preventive element. The latter was manifested in the appeal to the Montery Grand Jury, the former was the overt killings of the three black prisoners. There are twofold conditioning instances of this nature so frequent and numerous that it would be senseless to attempt naming them all. But special attention should be given to just a few of the State moves. The Soledad Brothers--John Clutchette and Fleeta Drumgo--were acquitted, but not before the State had murdered George Jackson. John was given a parole date, but not before two years of being victimized by the State. To save face during that trial, in which there was absolutely no evidence against the Soledad Brothers, the State framed Fleeta so as to make possible future attempts to murder the brother. In Attica, to protect perpetrators and the real murderers of over 50 people, the State is setting up the "prevented" aspect of the conditioning by indicting prisoners who had no militarty assault weapons. Angela was acquitted while the State continues to suppress evidence that will prove Ruchell Magee was illegally in prison in the first place. While the California Supreme Court abolished the death penalty, Hugo Pinell was being brought up from Soledad Prison to San Quentin almost weekly and beaten every time he entered the walls of San Quentin; then he was convicted in Monterey County in a trial that was so clumsily a railroad that even State Senators called for an "investigation of what seems to be foul play." While David Hilliard's Federal charges were dropped, Jeffery Khatari Boulden was given no time in which to prepare his defense in Sacramento and the State forced a four day murder trial and fallacious conviction upon him. These instances, some still in their judiciary stages, will show the overt acts as time passes; the State will even allow for time to pass in order to protect their obvious intent of overt acts. 
  The intent is nonetheless a greater part of reality than not, for the fact is the State is in full control over these instances in the present prison functions. Their relation to historical social phenomenon (lynching) is their essential results. The three black prisoners were murdered at Soledad, but the State says that there was no crime committed. "Justifiable homicide" was an excuse for the overt act of murder; the latter was employed for State interest--to protect the capitalist State by reinforcing the presence of State

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power ad infinitum. Professor Cox says of the legality involved in lynching when it was "popular" in the South:

Lynching in the South is not a crime, and this notwithstanding the fact that a few state statutes apparently proscribe it. It is quite obvious that the constitutions of the Southern States and their supporting black codes, the system of discriminating laws intended to keep Negroes in their place, intentionally put the Negro beyond the full protection of the law, and that the former take precedence over any contravening statute. Furthermore, it is clear that the political power of the area aims at class exclusiveness.16


  When lynchings were "popular" in the Southern states the few state statutes proscribing them were disregarded during the actual act because there was no intention--on the ruling classes part--of breaking their own legs. And after the actual act the statutes were merely talked about by "liberals." The criminality of lynching was substituted by harangues, emphasizing moral behavior and the likes, or, at most, a few of the criminals (lynchers) were taken to trial, but never was there a conviction (today it is called justifiable homicide). This in itself indicates quite conclusively that for black people in Amerikla "laws" are but stacks of paper with no meaning of justice whatsoever. We must consider with great attempts at understanding that the "political power (aimed) at class exclusiveness" was not simply a social reaction by whites toward black skin for "In reality political power is nothing but a vehicle for the economic process."17


SO IT IS PROPER here to say that the Southern social reaction (lynching) was only an affect of the economic cause (capitalism). The system allows for the indiscriminate lynching of black people in order to keep Negroes in their place, and this place is in fact a socio-economic one. What is more, just as there were "laws" (or the neglect of laws) allowing for criminal acts to be committed in order to prevent what Amerikla would have us believe was only the black socio-economic rise in capitalist society, there were "laws" allowing criminal acts to be committed to prevent the socio-economic rise of any lower class in Amerikla. In the historical social phenomenon of lynching and it's direct relation tot he fallacy of judicial "justice," Professor Cox says of a sect what may be applied to Amerikla:

  ...The sense of penal immunity which pervades the mob (of lynchers) amounting frequently to elation in performance of a social service, tends to belie the theory that lynching is criminal.18

 Thus if we take this "social service" definition, it means that murder by a "mob" is allowed as long as this crime is in the interest of the capitalist upper class. What interest? The interest in the form of protection; one lower class fighting another: never recognizing the real enemy, the capitalist upper class who have created the condition of "social unrest...racism." This is a very difficult area to go into, so I will be content with Professor Cox's observation:

  Nothing serves to bring the Southern congressmen so solidly in opposition as a national movement to pass legislation making lynching a crime. We should expect this because to make lynching a crime would be to strike at the pivot of white dominance in the Southern; to make lynching a crime would be to indict the political leadership of the South; indeed, to make lynching a Federal crime would be to bring before the nation the full unfinished business of the Civil War.19

Who in the present society would think of indicting the governor of California? This is precisely why Cleveland Edwards, Alvin Miller, and W.L. Nolen's deaths were ruled "justifiable homicide," no one was willing to push for an indictment of the "political leadership." Lynching was already a "Federal crime." We must take notice that in every lynching there was a denial of "due process of law," and the Federal Constitution "guarantees" that everyone receive "due process of law." But never mind that. Murder, be it by the act of lynching or a sadistic maniac stationed in a gun tower with an assault carbine, is in fact a crime notwithstanding that the motive is to hide another crime.

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