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economics and safety.  It has often been said that the only 100% safe aircraft is one which never leaves the ground.  However, the economics of such would be nil and the problem is where to adjust the meeting point of the conflicting interests.  Here is where, oftentimes, it is necessary to have the CAA/CAB as a sort of umpire, balancing economics, safety, and public interest one against the other.

In discussing Figure 2 the apparent influence of CAR 04 on the safety record of modern four engine planes was pointed out.  It appears that these regulations have put a minimum floor under the characteristics of these designs while at the same time allowing enough leeway for sound economics.  However, this evenness of the safety record suggests a corollary:  the planes were tailored to exactly meet the regulatory requirements, in at least several respects.  This, though understandable in view of the intense competition among manufacturers, is not exactly desireable for it tends to stifle safety progress.  However, competition being the American way of doing things, the situation will probably remain much the same in the future which points to the constant necessity for the CAB to make the requirements ever higher as the state of the art permits.

Much the same situation exists on the airlines in regard to their operating rules, CAR 41 and 61.  Here, however, there


is discernible a tendency on the part of some lines to conduct their operations on a safety plane above that required by the government agencies.  This sometimes puts them at a competitive disadvantage in spite of their higher safety record, since it is as much the other fellow's record as one's own that determines the desire of the public for air transportation.  Therefore, the CAB should always be alert to incorporate in the regulations, as applicable to all those advances of any carrier which raise the level of flight safety.

As inferred above, the regulations should be fluid as well as realistic.  Where weak spots show up, the regulations should be modified to cope with them.  A recent case in point was the ammendment of the stalling regulations of CAR 04.  In this case a regulation that had served well for several years not only became a barrier to new development, but, in the case of one airplane at least, its literal application gave rise to a more dangerous condition than the one it was designed to prevent.  The regulation, with the support of manufacturers, airlines, and pilots, has now been modified and the condition referred to above is in the process of being rectified.

In providing this fluidity, the annual Airworthiness Review of the CAB Safety Bureau is extremely important.