Viewing page 46 of 69

This transcription has been completed. Contact us with corrections.

90

bowed down in disgraceful subserviency before the bigoted mandates of that blind fanaticism which prompted the Judge upon the bench to declare in his decree, in reference to one of these negroes, that, 'Although he might be stained with crime, yet he should not sigh in vain for Africa ;' and all because his hands were reeking with the blood of murdered white men!!  It is a base outrage (I can use no milder language,) upon all the sympathies of civilized life."

That is the complimentary manner in which the courts of the United States are treated by the brightest intellects of the South, in the Official Journal, and under the immediate supervision of the Executive Administration of the Government.

During the present session, a further correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Spanish minister has been communicated to Congress.  The Spanish minster seems to be ever attentive to all that is going on, in all the departments of Government, with relation to this case.  In a letter dated the 20th of March, 1840, he observes that the Secretary of State had confidently asked him to furnish a copy of the existing laws of Cuba relative to negro slavery.  What was this for?  Was the President of the United States under the impression that before he carried into effect this exercise of despotic power, to seize MEN, by his own warrant, and send them to foreign countries for punishment by his own order—there would be some sort of decency, at least, in having a show of evidence to show that the Spanish law required that they should be delivered up?  The Secretary of State asked Mr. Calderon for evidence in the case, but he had none to give.  He then "confidently" asked Mr. Argaiz for the law of Spain in the case—the law, be it remembered, on which the United States were presenting a suit against individuals, solely, as they alledge, in pursuance of a demand made by the minister of Spain to that effect.  What is the reply?  Mr. Argaiz says he cannot communicate the law officially, because he cannot recognize the jurisdiction of the Court over the case.  Here is another point-blank contradiction of the material averment of the claim which the United States Government is prosecuting here—that the suit is in pursuance of the demand of Spain now pending against the Government.  Mr. Argaiz, therefore, communicates a certain memorandum, "confidentially."  This memorandum begins,


91

"Mr. Forsyth was pleased, some  time since, to state to the Chevalier de Argaiz, that it would be expedient to obtain a copy of the laws now in force in the island of Cuba relative to slavery The Chevalier de Argaiz therefore immediately requested from the Captain General of that island every thing on the subject, which has been determined since the treaty concluded in 1818, between Spain and England."

Now, may it please the court, may I inquire why this demand was limited to laws subsequent to the treaty of 1818? The decree for abolishing the slave trade was issued in 1817. Why did the Spanish minister limit his request to laws passed after 1818? Why was not the decree of 1817 brought forward? Was it kept back because he thought, with Mr. Vega, that the laws had been broken so much in Cuba, that they were not in force? Or did he think the authentication of that Decree might have some injurious effect in the trial here? Whatever was the reason, it is certain that, to Mr. Forsyth's request for a "copy of the laws now in force in the Island of Cuba relative to slavery," only the laws since 1818 were communicated, and the Decree of 1817, making the slave trade unlawful and its victims free, was kept back. Even the treaty of 1835, which was communicated, "the Chevalier de Argaiz requests may be retuned to him," and consequently it does not appear among these papers.

In another letter, dated April 24th, 1840, the Chevalier de Argaiz refers to certain resolutions of the United States Senate, passed the 15th of the same month, commonly called Mr. Calhoun's resolutions. I showed the other day, that if these principles are just, and if they have any application to this case, Lieut. Gedney had no right no seize the vessel at all. The resolution declares that-

"A ship or vessel on the high seas, in time of peace, engaged in a lawful commerce, is, according to the laws of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State to which her flag belongs; as much so as if constituting a part of its own domain;" and "if such ship or vessel should be forced, by stress of weather, or other unavoidable cause, into the port and under the jurisdiction of a friendly power, she, and her cargo, and persons on board, with their property, and all the rights belonging to their personal relations as established by the laws of the state to which they belong, would be placed under the penalty which the laws of nations extend to the unfortunate under such circumstances."