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the act of Congress of 2d of March, 1799, to regulate the collection of duties &c.,[section 99.U.S. Laws 3, 226,]"the officers of the revenue cutters are authorized, required and directed to go on board all ships or vessels which shall arrive within the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound for the United States, and to search and examine the same, and every part thereof," for the purposes of revenue.

By the act of 2d of March, 1807, to prohibit the importation of slaves into the United States, [section 7, U.S. Laws 2, 96] it is provided that "if any ship or vessel shall be found, from and after the first day of January, 1808, in any river, port, bay, or harbor, or on the high seas, within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or hovering on the coast thereof, having on board any negro, mulato, or person of color, for the purpose of selling them as slaves, or with intent to land the same in any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, contrary to the prohibition of the act, every such ship or vessel, together with her tackle, apparel and furniture, and the goods or effects which shall be found on board the same, shall be forfeited to the use of the United States, and may be seized, prosecuted and condemned in any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof.  And it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, and he is hereby authorized, should he deem it expedient, to cause any of the armed vessels of the United States, to be manned and employed to cruise on any part of the coast of the United States, or territories thereof, where he may judge attempts will be made to violate the provisions of this act, and to instruct and direct the commanders of armed vessels of the United States all such ships or vessels, and moreover to seize, take and bring into any port of the United States, all ships or vessels of the United States wheresoever found on the high seas, contravening the provisions of this act, and to instruct and direct the commanders of armed vessels of the United States, to seize, take, and bring into any port of the United States all such ships or vessels, and moreover to seize, take and bring into any port of the United States, all ships or vessels of the United States wheresoever found on the high seas, contravening the provisions of this act, to be proceeded against according to law," &c.

Here there are two very extensive limitations, by the laws of the United States, upon the doctrines of Sir William Scott, pronounced in the case of the Louis.  These limitations embrace both the cases of the Antelop and of the Amistad.  Yet in the case of the Antelope, Chief Justice Marshall cites the opinions of Sir William Scott in the case of the Louis, without any notice whatever of the statute laws of the United States contradictory to those opinions, 



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and the Attorney General Grundy cites, in the case of the Amistad, the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in that of the Antelope, as authority for a principle which in that very opinion the Chief justice declares is not settled.

The truth is, that the opinions of Sir William Scott in the case of the Louis, have reference only to the slave trade, and in the shipment of slaves on the coast of Africa: the case of the Antelope was for the violation of the laws of the United States against the importation of slaves into the United States for sale.  In all these cases the right of visitation and search of foreign vessels is not a merely belligerent right; it is exercised at all times, in peace or war, and if a French ship laden with slaves were found hovering on the coast of the United States, or within at least four leagues of their shores, and brought in, neither would the possession be unlawfully divested, nor would the foreigner be left to the justice of his own country.  There is no act of Parliament against the importation of slaves into England for sale: the opinions of Sir William Scott look to no such case, for no such crime could then be committed.  They had no application therefore to the case of the Antelope, and were very erroneously cited as warranting the surrender of that vessel and her cargo of Africans to the Spanish claimants.

I have said that the decision of all courts of the United States in that case directing that surrender, are apologetic.  They admit that the traffic in slaves is contrary to the law of nature; that it is inhuman, cruel, odious, detestable; but that it is not contrary to the laws of nations, and therefore must be acknowledged, defended, protected and carried into execution for other nations by the Courts of the United States, although abhorrent to our laws as to the laws of nature.  For this distinction also, our courts are indebted to Sir William Scott, whose ingenuity in that same case of the Louis, lays down the following position, cited also approvingly, by Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion upon the case of the Antelope.

"A court," says the British Judge, "in the administration of law, cannot attribute criminality to an act where the law imputes none:  It must look to the legal standard of morality; and upon a question of this nature, that standard must be found in the law of nations, as fixed and evidenced by general and ancient and admitted practice, by treaties, and by the general tenor of the laws