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aid in the recovery of fugitive slaves, we claim that the appeal in the present case ought to be dismissed, on the ground that it is is not competent for any Court of Admiralty of the United State, to recognize as property, the recent victims of the African slave trade, who have achieved their own deliverance from slavery, and arrived here in the condition of freemen. Neither the Executive nor the Courts of the United States can, for such a purpose, give extra-territorial force to the municipal laws of a foreign state. It would be equally at war with the fundamental principles and policy of our government, as with the claims of humanity and justice. No state in this Union regards them as property. As the victims of piracy they are entitled to their freedom when imported by our own citizens, and no principle of comity can require us to regard them as property when claimed by foreigners. 9 Wheaton, 370, 362; 2 Mason, 158-161, 446; 1 Burg. Confl. 741; Story's Confl. 92; 2 Barn. and Cress. 463.

We deny that Ruiz and Montez, Spanish subjects, had a right to on any officer or Court of the United States to use the force of the government, or the process of the law for the purpose of again enslaving those who have thus escaped from foreign slavery, and sought an asylum here. We deny that the seizure of these persons by Lt. Gedney for such a purpose was a legal or justifiable act.

How would it be, - independently of the treaty between the United States and Spain, - upon the principles of our government, of the common law, or of the law of nations?

If a foreign slave vessel, engaged in a traffic which by our laws is denounced as inhuman and piratical, should be captured by the slaves while on her voyage from Africa to Cuba, and they should succeed in reaching our shores, have the constitution or laws of the United States imposed upon our judges, our naval officers, or our executive, the duty of seizing the unhappy fugitives and delivering them up to their oppressors?  Did the people of the United States, whose government is based on the great principles of the revolution, proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, confer upon the federal executive or judicial tribunals, the power of making our nation accessories to such atrocious violations of human right?

Is there any principle of international law, or law of comity which requires it? Are our Courts bound, and if not, are they at liberty, to give effect here to the slave-trade laws of a foreign nation, - to laws affecting strangers, never domiciled there, when, to give them such effect would be to violate the natural rights of men?

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