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234] ANNUAL REGISTER [[2 Columns]] ample is the most forcible and extensive. 7thly. Because the power given by this bill to a prince to marry after the age of twenty-six, having first entered in the books of the privy council his intention so to do, for twelve calendar months, is totally defeated by the subsequent proviso, "Unless both houses of Parliament shall, before the expiration of said twelve months, expressly declare their disapprobation of such intended marriage." We think this proviso lays great difficulties on future parliaments, as their silence in such a case, must express condemnation of the king's refusal; and their concurrence with such refusal, may prove a perpetual prohibition from marriage, to the person concerned. We conceive the right of conferring a discretionary power of prohibiting all marriages (whether vested in the crown alone, as intended by the message, or in the manner now enacted by the bill) to be above the reach of any legislature, as contrary to the original inherent rights of human nature, which as they are not derived from, or held under civil laws, by now civil laws whatsoever can be taken away. We freely allow that the legislature has a power of prescribing rules to marriage, as well as to every other species of contracts; but there is an essential and eternal difference, between regulating the mode in which a right may be enjoyed, and establishing a principle which may tend entirely to annihilate that right. To disable a man during his whole life, from contracting marriage, or, what is tantamount, to make his power of contracting such marriage, dependant neither on his choice, nor upon any fixed rule of law, but on the arbitrary will of any man, or set of men, is exceeding the power permitted by the divine providence to human legislatures: it is directly against the earliest command, given by God to mankind, contrary to the right of domestic society and comfort, and to the desire of lawful posterity, the first and best of the instincts planted in us by the author of our nature, and utterly incompatable with all religion, natural and revealed, and therefore a mere act of power, having neither the nature nor obligation of law. 8thly, Because we conceive this bill to be pregnant with civil discord and confusion; it has a natural tendency to produce a disputed title to the crown. If those who may be affected by it, are in power, they will easily procure a repeal of this act, and the confirmation of a marriage made contrary to it: and if they are not, it will at least be the source of the most dangerous party that can exist in any country, a party attached to a pretender to the crown, whose claim, he may assert, has been set aside b no other authority than that of an act, to which the legislature was not competent, as being contrary to the common rights of mankind. Such a claim, supported as it may be, by peculiar hardship in the case, must, as we conceive, at no very remote period, create great mischief and confusion. Lastly, Because this bill, which resorts to such harsh and unusual methods, at the same time provides for it's own purpose very uncertainly and very imperfectly, for it secures no remedy against the improper For the YEAR 1772. [235 [[2 Columns]] improper marriages of princesses, married into foreign families, and those of their issue, which may full as materially affect the interest of this nation, as the marriages of princes residing in the dominions of Great Britain. It provides no remedy at any age, against the improvident marriage of the king reigning, the marriage, of all others, the most important to the public. It provides nothing against the indiscreet marriage of a prince of the blood, being regent at the age of twenty one, nor furnishes any remedy against his permitting such marriages to others of the blood-royal, the regal power fully vesting in him as to this purpose, and without the assistance of his council: we cannot therefore, on the whole, avoid expressing our strong disapprobation of an act shaking so many of the foundations of law, religion and public security, for ends wholly disproportioned to such extraordinary efforts, and in favour of regulations, so ill calculated to answer the purposes for which it is pretended they are made: and we make this protest, that it may stand recorded to that posterity, which may suffer from the mischievous consequences of this act, that we have no part in the confusions and calamities brought upon them, by rendering uncertain the succession of the crown. Richmond Dorfet Abergavenny Torrington Portland Milton Abingdon Devonshire Rockingham Albemarle Fitzwilliam Craven Stamford John Bangor Dissentient, Because the liberty of marriage is a natural right inherent in mankind. Because this right is confirmed and enforced by the holy scriptures, which declare marriage to be of divine institution, and deny to none the benefit of that institution. Because the law of nature and divine institutions are not reversible by the power of human legislatures. Because there is a total difference between regulating the mode of exercising the right derived from the law of nature, and assuming or granting a discretionary power of taking it quite away. Because, though we think it expedient and agreeable to the dictates of reason, that minors should not marry without the consent of their parents or guardians, and that such consent should be necessary to render their marriage good and valid, as it likewise is in the exercise of all their other rights during the term of their nonage, it can no more be inferred from thence that we acknowledge a right to continue such restraint throughout their whole lives, than that we acknowledge a right to keep men or women in a state of endless nonage, which, unless in the case of idiots or incurable lunatics, would be absurd, unjust, and a manifest violation of the law of nature. Because, if a perpetual restraint upon marriage, or power given to restrain it, without limitation of time or age, be contrary to the natural and divine laws, (as we apprehend it to be) a law authorising such restraint, or conferring such a power, must be null and void in itself. Because, in any case, where the right of succeeding to the crown of
