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FREEDOMWAYS   THIRD QUARTER 1969

for the most part directed by the sentiments of the coup leaders who were then in prison or in hiding and had no real basis in any long term decisions taken by the new leaders. Of course such a situation was bound to lead to dangerous ambiguities.

divide and conquer

In the process of political existence and identity in the nation, and in the struggle to grasp the very ideals of the men whose incarceration had brought them to power, the new leaders, especially the southern hierarchy led by Ironsi, seemed to be indifferent to some of the more blatant betrayals of the same ideals in the execution of the January coup. The most tragic of these was the fact that owing to previously mentioned tactical errors the Ibo political hierarchy was virtually untouched by the events of January 15th while the North, West, and Mid-West lost nearly all their most prominent and active leaders. Naturally the increasing trauma of tribal and inter-tribal suspicion raised by this situation was ripe field for the nation's enemies. They did not hesitate. Picking the lines of weakest division the foreign jackals moved in early. They sought, and in some cases found, willing listeners in all sections of the country among the new leaders as well as among the people. They concentrated particularly on the East and the North. In the East, they spoke of Northern domination of the troop force of the Army as a potential threat to the south. In the North they spoke of Eastern domination of the key posts in the officer grades in the Arm as being a continuation of the evils that should have been destroyed by the January coup. What they were in fact doing was reading the already outlined ambiguities of the situation and heightening them along unnatural lines, being fully aware that that new Government was insecure in its directives because it was a Government by default. They felt that they could stave off the eventual correction of the January mistakes which correctives would give rise to a truly national Government working for the self-sufficiency of the community and against the continued ascendancy of external interests in the economic life of the nation. Tragically this trick worked to an extent and a line of suspicion was drawn between even the younger officers in the arm. The insensitivity of the Ironsi regime to this problem was remarkable.

the July meeting

If the realities had been realized early enough and the Ironsi hierarchy had been able and willing to take the drastic step of honoring

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