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JUNF, 1863      DOUGLASS' MONTHTY      841
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WILLIAM JOHNSON,
JAS. A. JACKSON, Sec'y.,
CHAS. HERMONG, Cor. Sec.,
REV. JACOB THOMAS,
JOHN A. BOLDING, Treas,
REV. JNO. DUNGEY, Chaplin.

To his Excellency, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States.

ADDRESS TO GENERAL FREMONT.

Poughkeepsie, March 2, 1863.

To General John C. Fremont: 

SIR;——We, the sons of Freedom, through our delegate, feel to give you an expression of our gratitude; not forgetting the love you bear for suffering humanity, your generosity and sympathy for God's poor, will ever remain a lasting proof of that innate goodness, for which you have long and justly been celebrated.  As a Patriot and General, you have our confidence.  We have offered the services of ten thousand men to his Excellency, the President, called the Fremont Legion, believing that you are the Joshua to lead us to the field of battle.  We pray that you will accept.  Then we can adopt the sentiment of the poet——

"From the great mountains to the sea,
One voice shall thunder we are free!"
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The newly commissioned black Surgeon, Dr. Augusta Canada, appeared on the streets of Washington in Major's uniform.  He has been assigned to Ullman's Brigade.
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CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
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The Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War consisted of Senators Wade and Chandler, and Messrs. Gooch of Mass., Covode of Pa., Julian of Ind., and Odell of N. Y.  Senators Johnson and Wright were at different times also members.  It was appointed in Dec., 1861, has worked hard, and has now presented a report which is, without evidence, as extensive as a book, which is of the utmost interests and importance, and whose leading conclusions we now give.  The Committee, compelled to choose among the departments of so enormous a field of labor, selected the army of the Potomac as the most important, and has examined about 200 witnesses, nearly all military men, and about 100 of them generals.  Their investigations include the organization of the army under McClellan, and all its succeeding history, down to and including the resignation of Gen. Burnside.

McClellan was made commander of the Army of the Potomac because it was expected that he would be prompt, vigorous, and successful in military operations.  His army was swelled in October, 1861, to 185,000 men, and was not allowed to be diminished for any purpose.  In that fall it was in a high state of efficiency, and neither its men nor commanders wished or meant to go into winter quarters.——The division into army corps, held by all the best generals indispensable to its proper handling, was stubbornly opposed by McClellan.——During the winter of 1861-2, the orders to the generals in front not to examine persons coming in with information and restrictions on scouting, kept the officers entirely ignorant of the rebel force at Manassas, which was at McClellan's headquarters reckoned at 210,000 men.  It has since been proved not to have reached 70,000!  The forts about Washington were never properly manned either; not even when the army moved in March, 1862.

The repeated and urgent efforts of the Navy Department to obtain the necessary co operation of the army to break up the rebel blockade of the Potomac, at one time obtained from McClellan a promise of 4,000 men, but this was twice broken, for no discoverable reason, unless it was McClellan's 'fear of bringing on a general engagement.'  The blockade was consequently never broken, the rebels leaving when they got ready.

Jan. 31, 1862, Mr. Lincoln, after McClellan had disobeyed the order for a general advance, ordered him specially to advance upon, seize, and occupy Manassas Junction, and to set out on or before Feb. 22.  McClellan objected
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that this move would divide the army, and argued for moving on Richmond either by the Rappahannock and across the country, or by Fortress Monroe.  The President yielded.  A council of generals decided in February for the Rappahannock route, but the rebels evacuated Manassas March 10, and on this McClellan, after his aimless march to Manassas, determined on and took the Peninsula road, having to leave a heavy force to defend Washington, and thus committing the very error of dividing his army, which he had objected to Mr. Lincoln's plan of advance.

It was arranged, on the advice of all the generals of army corps, to leave about 55,000 men as a force necessary to protect Washington, and Mr. Lincoln so ordered.  Yet when McClellan left for the Peninsula, he ordered all these except some 11,000 disorganized troops to join him or leave Washington and relieve others who were to join him, which would have left the city almost ungarrisoned; and Gens. Thomas and Hitchock, examining by order, reported to the President that his orders to have the city left secure had been disobeyed.  On this Mr. Lincoln ordered McDowell's corps to remain.

Heintzelman, who first landed at Fortress Monroe, could have advanced at once and isolated Yorktown, which would have left an open road to Richmond: McClellan forbade it, and gave no answer to a request of Gen. Hamilton for leave to force the rebel lines at Yorktown.  Magruder had but from 7000 to 12,000 men there, and was not re-enforced until it became evident that McClellan was going to commence a regular siege.

This siege was undertaken contrary to Mr. Lincoln's wish.  During it, McClellan could not tell within 25,000 how many troops he had.  And the President urged him in vain 'to strike a blow,' while McClellan incessantly called for more and more troops.  After a wasted month at Yorktown, the rebels evacuated just a day before McClellan had meant to open [[???]]

Stoneman, Hooker, and other generals pursued the rebels, and the battle of Williamsburgh ensued, fought chiefly by Hooker, he and the other generals acting independently and without any commander-in-chief, McClellan remaining at Yorktown to see about some embarking, and reaching the field when the fighting was about over.  If the enemy had been sharply followed, our army for the second time might have entered Richmond almost without opposition.

Two weeks were now occupied in advancing from Williamsburgh to Chickahominy, some twenty-five miles.  The demands for re-enforcements still continued, and McDowell's corps would in fact have been sent, leaving Washington undefended, had not Jackson's raid down the Shenandoah detained him by a diversion.

None of the battles on the Chickahominy, nor on the retreat to Harrison's Bar, were fought by McClellan, but all of them by the division generals——Casey, Hooker, Sumner, Heintzelman, or as the case might be——without the presence or any orders or directions whatever from McClellan.  After the battle of Fair Oaks, the army a third time could have advanced at once upon Richmond.  But no advance was made; the calls for re-enforcements and charges that Government was not sustaining the army were constant; Stuarts cavalry raid showed the enemy our weak position; and the attack on our right drove the army back to the James.

When the retreat to the James was decided on, McClellan printed an order for the distruction of all the tents, baggage, camp equipage, etc., of the whole army; and was dissuaded from issuing it by Col. Alexander's remonstrances.

After the final and furious battle of Malvern Hill, fought like the others without the presence or direction of McClellan, the army, wearied but victorious, for a fourth time might have advanced into Richmond.  At the retreat from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Bar, our army was huddled together in a disorderly helpless mass.  It was a day before orders were given to occupy the high ground which
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commanded the position, or even to put the troops in such positions as to enable them to resist an attack.  The enemy were struggling to bring up their guns and attack; had not a heavy rain prevented they would have done so; and the army must have been destroyed.

During the 5 or 6 weeks of inaction at Harrison's Bar, the army, many of its regiments having lost arms, camp equipage, etc., became sickly, discouraged, demoralized, and inefficient, nor was any attempt made to do anything with it.  A prominent commander testified that his command was unable to march three miles and fight a battle.  McClellan demanded 50,000 troops more, for resuming active operations; Halleck could not furnish 20,000; McClellan agreed to advance again with them, but immediately renewed his demand for more; and as they could not be had, the army was withdrawn from the Peninsula.  Between June 25 and reaching Harrison's Bar, the number of men killed, wounded, and missing, was 14,000.

The report on the Peninsular campaign concludes with part of Gen. Barnard's (the distinguished engineer officer) report on the Peninsular failure and its causes.  Those causes are started by Gen. Barnard to be: McClellan's inaction for 8 months, from Aug., 1861, to Apr. 1862; the failure to take Norfolk in that winter; the failure to promptly assault and carry Yorktown; the diseases contracted before it; the blundering and ill-fought battle of Williamsburgh; the choice of a line of operations north along the Chickahominy, instead of south along with a naval force on the James; the delay of two weeks in reaching the Chickahominy; the failure to follow into Richmond after Fair Oaks; and the insufficient preparations and wrong dispositions which resulted in outflanking our forces and the retreat to the James.

THe Committee, as to the delays to re-enforce Pope, refers to the courts on McDowell and Fitz John Porter, and quotes correspondence and dispatches which show delay, reluctance, and disobedience, and a stubborn persistent failure to obey orders and re-enforce Pope, the fatal success of which crimes is too well known.  We quote one question and answer in Gen. Halleck's evidence on this point:

QU. Had the Army of the Peninsula been brought to co-operate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgement as a military man would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?

AES. I thought so at the time, and still think so.

The Antietam campaign was conducted with 'the same unreadiness to move promptly and act vigorously, the same desire for more troops before advancing, and the same references to the great superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy.'

The battle of Antietam was indecisive in consequence of our troops attacking by 'driblets,' instead of by heavy masses.  It should have been renewed next morning, and fresh troops for the purpose were abundant.  Only this delay in attacking enabled the enemy to escape into Maryland.  They could have been utterly destroyed.

After the battle, McClellan wanted to fortify Maryland Hights, (near Harper's Ferry,) and remain in that vicinity to watch the enemy or to await and instruct new troops; and afterwards to build a double-track suspension railroad-bridge and permanent wagon bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry but was refused.  Halleck complained that the army was too slow, but in vain.  Oct. 6, 1862, he peremptorily ordered McClellan to 'cross the Potomac and give battle o the enemy or drive him South.'  McClellan answered with inquiries about roads and re-enforcements.——Oct. 16, Stuart's second circumnavigation of our army took place.  McCLellan said it was because our cavalry was deficient; and Hallack answered by direction of Mr. Lincoln that if the enemy had more occupation south of the river, they would give less trouble north of it.

The delays and calls for reinforcements still continued, as did the series of attempts to cause some rapid or efficient movement by our army.  It was a vain endeavor.  No [[?]]
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