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^[[25]] ^[[25]]    February 25, 1974

Dear Alice:

That German offensive that seemed so scary on July 15, 1918 did not get very far. Crossing the Marne on the first day, it drove southward three or four miles on about a twelve-mile front. Next day we heard that the Germans were being held. Another day passed. Our guess was that the Germans, each night, were moving men, guns and supp^[[l]]ies across for a renewal of their drive.  Maybe they were, but on the 18th they had someting else to think about.

On the night of July 17th, after I had gone to sleep, a guard came to our quarters and woke me.  He also woke Howard Douglas, our chief observer, a first lieutenant of infantry. We were to report at the squadron office.  We dressed and went. It was nearly midnight. At the office we found Littauer, our adjutant Powers, and a stranger, a colonel. He was American. I have forgotten his name, but he came from the staff of General Mangin, the French commander of the allied army operating on the western side of the Chateau-Thierry salient. It was a mixed army of French and American units. Normally orders to us ^[[strikethrough]] we [[/strikethrough]] would have been transmitted through a corps or divisional staff, but our squadron had not yet been assigned to any such subordinate unit. So the messenger had been sent to us directly. He began by saying that the allies were about to launch an attack next morning on the whole Chateau-Thierry salient.

That was surprising as well as exciting. The allies had been on the ^[[strikethrough]] the [[/strikethrough]] defensive ever since I had arrived in France, and I had come to think of that as the natural and normal state of affairs. But the Germans around Chateau-Thierry were in a pocket they had created. Their situation invited a flank attack, and no doubt Foch had long been itching to deliver it. He had had to wait for the American buildup to give him the necessary manpower. And now the German drive on the 15th had simply made them more vulnerable.  They had deepened, without widening, the pocket they were in.

One advantage of being an observer was that you got such briefings as the colonel gave us. To do his work intelligently an observer had to be informed in advance of any offensive operation of his own division and of those adjacent to it in line. The colonel outlined to us the whole plan of attack of Mangin's army. Most of the attacking