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and also to those of our allies. We should not plan for victory alone; a victory which included the destruction of American cities and the loss of millions of American lives should not be the kind of victory we seek. The problem of mobilizing our national potential rapidly and effectively in a future war is largely a problem of realistic planning, which must include planning for the proper utilization of manpower. Expansion of the armed forces and reorganization of the national economy for war will create simultaneous demands upon the nation's manpower. Even in a surplus manpower existed, which would amply fill the demands of the armed forces and the production forces, the tas of placing qualified individuals where they will be needed would be an enormous one. A military-economic balance must be maintained. Manpower must be allocated to the armed forces and to the industry in the proportion that will provide the most effective military force and at the same time permit the fulfillment of essential civilian requirements. Carpenters and other construction workers should not be inducted into the armed forces while there exists a dire shortage of such workers needed to build housing and training facilities for the armed forces; and at a later stage of mobilization, skilled workers should not be required to continue to pile up an excess of munitions while they are urgently needed in the armed forces. Thus, timing and balance are necessary in the allocation of manpower. Proper planning must not permit the stoppage of critical work in one area because of a shortage of manpower, while there is over-production elsewhere. Peak loads exist at different times in construction, transportation, manufacturing and power industries, because of their share in different phases of the war program. While these peak loads are occuring, however, the 5