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build-up of the armed forces must go on. There is continuous change, therefore, in the proportion of the labor force, and if the war is to be prosecuted most effectively, the allocation of manpower must reflect this change. [[footnote]]2

Since pre-World War II mobilization planners assumed "ample quantities of labor, power, facilities...raw materials necessary in war," no effective plans existed for the utilisation of manpower. The Eberstadt Report states: "It is the unanimous testimony of the officials of the manpower agencies who were consulted during this investigation that comprehensive plans for the mobilization and utilization of the nation's manpower resources did not exist at the outbreak of war." From the expansion due to land-lease activity in 1941, however, predictions were made in 1942 of a general scarcity of labor. This prediction became a fact in 1943, and still there were no plans available to meet the situation.[[footnote]]3 Our experience in World War II, therefore, was one of "muddling through" in our utilization of manpower. As late as 1943, the debate continued as to what proportion of available manpower should go into the armed forces, industry, and agriculture. Little effort had been made to curtail peacetime industry. Instead of reducing the manpower and the amount of effort used in non-essential occupations, production in this field actually increased by about 25%. [[footnote]]4

Manpower was administered during World War II by the War Manpower Commission, an executive agency of the President. Its Chairman, Mr. Paul V. McNutt, defined the principle of utilization of manpower as

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[[footnote]]2 [[underlined]] Military Economic Balance [[/underlined]], Industrial Collage of the Armed Forces, pp. 3f, 59ff.
[[footnote]]3 Toid, p. 17.
[[footnote]]4 Williston, A. L., [[underlined]] National Services in the United States [[/underlined]], p. 11.

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