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any root to grab to loop from sliding over the precipice of the southern line, but also because our navy is greatly influenced by British opinion, or expressed opinion. Consequently, the United States must be sure of its negotiations with Great Britain in anything affecting possible military operations against Japan.
Should we be lead to adopt the southern route as a line of operations, with the expectation of British assistance against Japan, any sea power experiments along that line would end in utter failure without their assistance. For that matter, any advance of sea power across the Pacific, except as the auxiliary of air power, is a practical impossibility.
Having taken this hasty survey of our strategical position in the Pacific, let us turn a moment to a consideration of what is necessary to establish a military depot, or magazine, sometimes erroneously called a base. Any army may occupy a position, and if given a few days to prepare it for defense, may develop it to almost as great an extent as if it had been there for a protracted space of time. If its communications are squarely behind it and, particularly, if hostile ground


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