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be destroyed, and that the ports should be demolished. However, the ideas as to how this should be done were quite rudimentary in comparison to what we have learned from our experiments in bombardment in this country.
The general conclusion was that, as compared with armies and navies, France's air force must be developed as the great means of striking at the inception of a campaign; that at least one-half of their total air force of four thousand planes should be kept constantly under arms and capable of striking within two days of the declaration of war, and that, within two weeks after this, an additional force of two thousand ships should be on a war footing with adequate reserves of both men and material. The airways through France, the meteorological service, fuel and ammunition stations, and the radio systems should all be under one head for the use of the air service. The method of operation for this organization has already been adopted. It remains now to create the personnel and instruct them in their duties, and to obtain the material necessary for the proper equipment of the units.
From my inspection of the French air units themselves, which comprise observation aviation, pursuit aviation, and bombardment aviation, I found their most difficult problem to be the same
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