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This danger of formalism may seem to be unduly stressed. But caution is necessary in our studies of all arms of the service today. In none though is this needed to the same extent as in the study of all matters pertaining to airplanes. The development of aviation has been to a great extent a direct result of the World War. Other arms have a long history behind them, so that the danger of deducing rules from isolated cases is greatly lessened, insofar as they are concerned. But the World War alone furnishes the experience from which useful lessons in aviation may be drawn for the future. This experience has been extensive, and constitutes a mine of information on the employment of aircraft. But it must be worked circumspectly. We must always bear in mind that the World War was quite exceptional in many of its phases. We have emphasized the fact that the only true manifestation of war is the battle. Later we shall see that sine qua non of battle is movement. If we accept this qualification, it may be said that the World War was singularly lacking in battles during the greater part of its duration. It is true there was an unending trial of spirit and a continuous drain on resources in men and materiel during the long years that covered the period of trench warfare. And it was precisely during this period - it might be called, not inaptly, the Siege of France - that the rapid development of the airplane occurred. Yet this period saw no battles, in the rather restricted meaning we have given that word. No decision was approached in that strange war of usure, where the two locked opponents husbanded their strength for the final round. If we would therefore avoid erroneous conclusions for the future, we must regard that period as indeed a siege, and the bloody engagements that were fought, not as battles but as sorties. We must not follow servilely the methods of trench warfare,

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