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to state that one bomb or bullet from the air has the moral effect of several from the ground.

The mobility of air forces constitutes an important factor in their use. Where the concentration of ground troops is a matter of days or even weeks, the concentration of air forces may be effected in hours. So that the commander may hold them out to a very late hour. and not commit them till the situation has clearly unfolded itself, and the point of attack is fixed. Generalship, with air forces, has a wider latitude in still another respect. With ground troops the real control exercised by a General is limited largely to his reserve in hand; other troops, once thrown in, are gone, in so far as the influence of the command on the battle is concerned. But air forces differ in this respect from their comrades on the ground, for they return automatically to the reserve, once their mission is performed, and are again available after a few hours for other uses.

We can therefore predict, almost with certainty, that the mass of attack in future wars will contain an increasing force of airplanes, armed with machine guns and bombs.

Partial disorganisation is inevitable accompaniment of every battle. It is indeed not uncommon, as at First Bull Run, to fin the victor only one degree less disorganized than the vanquished. So that a fully developed third phase -- reaping the fruits of victory in the pursuit -- is rarely met with. Yet it is precisely in this phase that the heaviest losses may be inflicted on the enemy with least cost. The most common causes of failures to achieve this are fatigue and diserganisation, with its consequent immobility, both of mounted and dismounted forces. 

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