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    This recommendation has been previously made and submitted to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, and it is understood that some change is under consideration.

(c) There should be a minimum of 25 trucks, with each squadron of 12 aeroplanes.
    The present Tables of Organization provide for 21 trucks only.
    This recommendation has been previously made to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

(d) A field aero squadron, should confine its duties to the military application of the aeroplane for use in active service, and all aeroplanes consigned to a field squadron should be ready for such service when received.  On account of the numerous problems which have been encountered during the past three months, a great amount of repair and alteration work has been done at this station, which normally should have been done by the manufacturers, before the aeroplanes, motors and propellers were shipped from the factories.  In other words, aeroplane, consigned to a field aero squadron, should upon receipt, and assembly, be ready for field service, without wasting a lot of time in overhauling and altering motors and aeroplanes.

(e) Heretofore all aeroplanes, received by the Government, have been tested at or near sea level altitudes, and generally under most favorable conditions.  Tests under such conditions are not service tests.  Aeroplanes intended to be used in field service, should be tested under as severe conditions of service, as possible.  Such tests should include flying in locations where great variations of temperature and low percentage of humidity are found.  They should be tested where the starting altitude is approximately 5000 feet above sea level, and where sand and rain storms are frequently encountered.  These are the exact conditions under which the 1st Aero Squadron performed its flying work in Mexico and New Mexico, and it is believed that these are the maximum service conditions to which an aero squadron will be subjected in any field service that may be encountered in North America.
    It is therefore recommended that no aeroplane be accepted for field service with a mobile army, unless it has been tested under service conditions as stated herein, and that whenever alterations are necessary, to place an aeroplane in fit condition for field service, such alterations shall be made by the manufacturers.

(f) With reference to conducting service tests, of all aeroplanes, intended for service in  the mobile army, it is recommended that the Government establish an aeroplane testing station at Fort Eliss, El Paso, Texas, or someother [[1]] military station on the Mexican border, where the altitude above sea level and the average climatic conditions throughout the year are more closely related to maximum service conditions.

    The Squadron Commander invites attention to the fact, that the 1st Aero Squadron, S.C., is the first organization of its kind that has ever been used in active field service in the history of the United States Army.  This command took the field aeroplanes of very low military efficiency, and with less than 50% if its authorized allowance of truck transportation.  Due to lack of aeroplanes with greater carrying capacity, all flying officers were continuously called upon to take extraordinary risks in every reconnaissance flight made while on duty in Mexico.  All officers, while flying through mountainous canyons and over rugged mountains, would invariably result in death.  They also appreciated the fact, that in a forced landing even if safely made, there was every possible risk of being taken prisoner, by an enemy, whose ideas of the Laws of War, are on par with an uncivilized race of savages.

    All officers, pilots, on duty with this command, during its active service in Mexico, were constantly being exposed to personal risk and physical suffering.  Due to inadequate weight carring [[2]] capacity of all aeroplanes, it was possible to even carry sufficient food, water or clothing, on many of the reconnaissance flights.  Pilots, in flight, were frequently caught in snow, rain and hail storms which, due to inadequate clothing, invariably caused excessive suffering.
    In several instances,pilots were compelled to make forced landings in desert and hostile county, fifty to seventy miles from the nearest troops.

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Transcription Notes:
[[1]] as in text [[2]] as in text [[3]] centered