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10.

The materiel, the methods of training and firing and the targets of the antiaircraft service differ vitally from those of the coast artillery proper, and coast artillery personnel untrained in antiaircraft methods and operation is no better fitted to do antiaircraft work than is personnel chosen from other branches of the service.  In short, there appears to be no good reasons for the antiaircraft service forming part of the coast artillery corps.

(2) Present training regulations provide that the antiaircraft regiment of the corps, and the antiaircraft brigade of the army shall form parts of the commands of the corps and army chiefs of artillery respectively.  However, the antiaircraft service is not an artillery service; its missions are separate and distinct from those of the field artillery units of a field force and special coordination in fire missions between the two services is not required.  No good reason is seen for continuing this association under one command of two services differing so widely both in composition and in mission.

(3) Since aircraft form the only targets for the antiaircraft service, effective antiaircraft training necessitates constant close association with the air service.  Not only must aircraft be used for a continued program involving locating, aiming and firing at aerial targets by night and day, but all antiaircraft personnel require constant association with the air service in order to become familiar with the sound, appearance and habits of flight of different types of aircraft.  In no other way can the antiaircraft service obtain this familiarity with aircraft so essential to their effective operation in time of war.

By locating antiaircraft units at air service training centers, the former could receive daily training in everything, except actual firing, without the necessity of transporting aircraft to the stations of the antiaircraft units as is now necessary.  Thus the training of the antiaircraft units could proceed without interfering practically at all with the operation of aircraft as now conducted at flying fields.

(4) The efficiency of the antiaircraft service could be greatly improved were the units stationed in close proximity to the large flying centers of the air service regardless of what branch of the army controls the antiaircraft service, but it is believed that the development and training of this service would be effected with the minimum of overhead, the maximum of cooperation and the best general results if it were a branch of the air service.

d. (1) The mission of the antiaircraft service is to drive off or destroy such hostile aircraft as may threaten or attack our aircraft and ground forces and establishments.  Its operations are strictly defensive in character and its results are obtained by direct means.

(2) One of the primary missions of the air service is to search out, attack and destroy all hostile aircraft wherever they may be.  Pursuit aviation attacks hostile aircraft while in flight; attack and bombardment aviation destroy the hostile aircraft while the latter are upon their airdromes.  The action of the air service is strictly offensive but nevertheless it does protect our forces by indirect means.

e. (1) Antiaircraft operations must be closely coordinated with those of aircraft because:

(a) The information obtained by the lookout and listening services of the antiaircraft service is of great importance not only to itself but to the air service as well.

(b) Information obtained by aircraft operating over the hostile lines and terrain is likewise of great importance to both services.

(c) The closest liaison is necessary between the two services in order to insure that searchlights and antiaircraft fire are used only against hostile aircraft and not against our own.