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The one great asset, from an aeronautical standpoint, which the United States accumulated during the war was the training of a navigating personnel of something like 15,000 officers, that is, pilots and observers. Without flying personnel, it makes no difference how many airplanes one may have -- they cannot be used; and, as flying is the basis of all aeronautical work, it makes no difference how many ground officers there may be on hand -- no work can be done in the air. In the second place, an air industry was developed in this country, which, although it copied foreign models of airplanes (which, naturally, did not allow our inventive genius to assert itself very greatly in devising new equipment), still applied methods of manufacture to equipment it was given to build which were probably the equal or superior to any in the world. This industry, on account of having been denied any appropriations for the construction of new airships by the Government, has practically ceased to exist. It may be said that this is the only country of any magnitude in which this has been the case.

As to the personnel, the United States Army as retained on a temporary status only 900 pilots and observers in its service. The others have all returned to civil life, with no organization and practically no means of keeping up with or getting them back into the service in case of necessity. This personnel will not willingly serve in any other branch of the national service, either Army or Navy, because their whole interest and experience lie in aviation. On the other hand, practically all would be perfectly willing to come into an aviation reserve, providing they could see a visible asset for the nation in such an organization. If these men are not organized, no return will be derived from the tremendous amounts expended on them from a prospective standpoint in case of any further trouble, and, if they are not incorporated into reserve units, within five years they will cease to be an asset for the nation. Our strength in war should be developed by the utilization of reserve units to the greatest extent possible, retaining only such aeronautical units in active service as are necessary for our temporary needs, the building up of a training system, the garrisoning of our insular possessions, and for striking forces against contiguous territory, which may be necessary on short notice.

What we should aim to do by law, therefore, is to accomplish the greatest economy in administration and overhead expenditure, combined with the greatest development of our aeronautical means because of its great value in war and in commerce. This can only be developed by unifying our activities and directing them along coordinated and practical lines as other nations have already done. To leave aviation essentially under the dominance and direction of another department is to absolutely strangle its development, because it will be looked on by them merely as an auxiliary and not as a principal thing. It is easy to see what the result would be should the United States be called upon to meet in war a nation having a united Air Service. There would be no question as to which would have the predominating air force at the desired point at the critical time. If the United States does not de-