Viewing page 192 of 236

This transcription has been completed. Contact us with corrections.

they are not incorporated into reserve units, within five years they will cease to be an asset for the nation. Our strength in war should be developed by the utilization of reserve units to the greatest extent possible, retaining only such aeronautical units in active service as are necessary for our temporary needs, the garrisoning of our insular possessions, and for striking forces against contiguous territory, which may be necessary on short notice.

What we should aim to do by law, therefore, is to accomplish the greatest economy in administration and overhead expenditure, combined with the greatest development of our aeronautical means because of its great value in war and commerce. This can only be developed by unifying our activities and directing them along coordinated and practical lines as other nations have already done. To leave aviation essentially under the dominance and direction of another department is to absolutely strangle its development, because it will be looked on by them merely as an auxiliary and not as a principal thing. It is easy to see what the result would be should the United States be called upon to meet in war a nation having a united Air Service. There would be no question as to which would have the predominating air force at the desired point at the critical time. If the United States does not decide to have a united Air Service, it will practically amount to saying to the world, “We do not want an Air Service. You can take it.”

Proposed legislation before Congress, as incorporated in

the New Bill, contemplates that all technical means for the develop-