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of every sort were dispatched throughout the hours of daylight. Command planes, infantry contact patrols and visual reconnaissances kept the command well posted on the advance of the troops and the situation within the enemy's lines to the depth of 12 kilometers. Photographic missions resulted in a large number of photographs of front line positions. Artillery surveillance planes moured much valuable information and some successful adjustments were made on fleeting targets.
From the morning of the 14th the increased hostile persuit aviation repeatedly attacked our observation planes. 
Several causes attributed to the lack of success in adjusting artillery fire in fugitive targets. A number of new squadrons took part, none of whom had participated in a large scale offensive, although some had had considerable experience working in quiet sectors. 
A fair number of their pilots and observers were inexperienced in operations over the front. They sent the targets located to the Corps P.C.'s instead of direct to Artillery P.C.'s for immediate attention. In some instances radio calls to Artilery P.C.'s failed to elicit response by panels, and the observer failed to drop a written message. The radio and panel failures