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The plan as outlined for the concentration of the units was well carried out, all being in place at the allotted time. It had been accomplished without the details of the movement being observed by the enemy, thanks to our well-laid plans and the bad weather which had existed for several days previous, preventing and hindering hostile reconnaissance aviation in their work.

The enemy had been losing ground, personnel and materiel at all points on the Front where [[strikethrough]] on which [[/strikethrough]] the Allied Armies were attacking. On the Front of the First Army he was holding the line Pont-sur-Seille---St. Mihiel-Fresnes-en-Woevre---Chattillon-sous-les-cotes, in his old positions. His Air Service was estimated at 150 pursuit, 120 reconnaissance and 25 battle planes, all of which were being reinforced; the strength of his ground troops [[strikethrough]] was estimated [[/strikethrough]] at about 7 divisions with from three to five divisions in reserve, and reports received indicated that his strength and morale was low. All signs indicated that he intended withdrawing from his first lines and making his main resistance at some point further to the rear.

Orders were received for the First Army to attack on the whole Front on September 12, 1918, at H hour. The hour of attack was set at 5 A.M. The First and Fourth Corps were to attack at H hour; the Fifth Corps at H plus 3 hours, 8 A.M.; the Second Colonial French Corpsas follows: That portion west of the Fourth Corps at H plus 1 hour, 6 A.M.; That portion south of the Fifth Corps at H plus 4 hours, 9 A.M. The artillery preparation on all fronts was to commence at H minus 4 hours, 1 A.M.

The Air Service was to be in the air at daylight, and take offensive at all points with the object of destroying the enemy's Air Service, attacking his troops on the ground and of protecting our own air and ground troops.