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46.

centration of pursuit and bombardment, as well as the concentration of our entire combat Air Service were not fully developed nor most successfully employed until the Argonne-Meuse offensive.

Our day bombardment had conducted their raids without proper coordination with the pursuit for adequate protection and it had suffered heavy losses in personnel and planes with a consequent loss of morale. The method finally evolved of designating definite places for rendezvous at the most dangerous points along the route to be followed was not successfully used until the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

Great trouble had been encountered in securing proper cooperation with our ground troops. With the exception of three or four of the regular divisions which had received sufficient training, the infantry in nearly all cases refused to display their panels in the front line, while in a number of cases the artillery would neither put out their panel designating their post of command, set up their radio at every halt, nor keep their radio operators constantly on duty. Later, through a rigid course of instruction these conditions were greatly improved.

From September 15th to the 25th there was little or no activity on the part of our ground troops. But for the Air Service, it was a period of extreme activity marked by severe and repeated combats. Ground troops seldom appreciate the fact that when their activities have ceased, those of the Air Service continue without interruption, in a great many cases the fighting being more severe than during the battle, as the enemy's air concentration has probably reached its maximum at that time. Owing to the necessity of maintaining protective patrols at all times over the new positions in order that the Corps Air Service might systematically photograph them, and at the same time prevent the enemy from obtaining an exact idea of the movement of our troops, it was a period of intense