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Air Service, First Army, made a personal arrangement with the commander of the French Air Division whereby they were to assist in protecting this front.

As our main attack was to take place between the Meuse and the Aisne, with demonstration between the Meuse and the Moselle, it was necessary to employ practically all the Air Service over this front. At the same time, in order to deceive the enemy and to make him believe that the offensive was to be continued against Metz, it was necessary, up to the moment of the attack to act vigorously over his lines between la Chaussee and the Moselle River, on the right flank of this position, and north and east of Nancy, in order to hold his attention in that direction. The Air Service of the 8th French Army, which was on our right, had agreed to assist in this operation, but a difficult problem remained to be solved. All information necessary in the preparation of the attack, especially for the artillery preparation, had to be obtained without arousing the suspicions of the enemy, and still the work of his hostile observation units and balloons had to be hindered. The constant observation of the area north of the forest of Spincourt, as well as the right bank and [[strikethrough]] as well as [[/strikethrough]] the bridges of the Meuse River, was necessary in order to keep fully informed as to any enemy reinforcements coming from that direction. Naturally these missions were difficult if they were to be carried out successfully, without arousing the suspicions of the enemy or changing the usual aspect of the sector. Consequently, no attempt was to be made to secure the final details until the [[strikethrough]] 24 [[/strikethrough]] twenty-four hours preceding the attack, at which time our Air Service was to be thrown across the lines in force. With this scheme in view, the specific duties allotted each branch of aviation [[strikethrough]] were as follows: