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was also to be given to the attack of troops on the ground (rear guards, nests of resistance, reinforcements and reserves).

Provision was to be made for the selection of various airdromes near the posts of command of the larger units and for the Army Corps and Army Artillery Aviation. These were to be equipped for use at the earliest possible moment. If the movement forward was sufficiently important, new advanced ground was again to be selected and prepared in a similar manner. All arrangements connected with the above were alloted [[allotted]] to the equipment section.

The plan of preparation was carried out with the greatest success. Our Air Service, in addition to maintaining their patrols and activities to the east, had accomplished their move to the new fields and were in position for the attack. The concentration of the Army had been effected with the utmost secrecy, thanks to the efficiency of our Pursuit and to the fact that weather conditions favored us.

Along our entire front the enemy continued on the defensive, the power of initiative resting with the Allies. On the front of the First Army it was estimated that he had 13 divisions between the Meuse and the Moselle Rivers, and 5 divisions between the Meuse and the Aisne. His reserves were estimated at from 6 to 10 divisions, largely in the Metz area. His air service remained at approximately the same strength as at the end of the Battle of St. Mihiel and was disposed in the airdromes centering around Metz.

Orders were received on September 25th for the 4th French Army and the 1st American Army to attack at H hour on September 26th, while the 8th French Army was to make a demonstration on our right.