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LETTERS SUSTAIN MITCHELL CHARGE OF AIR RACE FIXING 
Nash star 11/11/25
Roosevelt and Patrick Correspondence Shows Agreement to Share Honors. 
REID HOLDS ACQUITTAL IS OBJECT OF TESTIMONY
Makes Flat Declaration in Wrangle Over Purpose of Summoning Witnesses.

Charges of Col. William Mitchell that there was an agreement existing between the Army and Navy that the annual air races would be divided between these services were corroborated by official correspondence introduced by counsel for Col. Mitchell at this afternoon's court-martial session.
The correspondence was between Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt and Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, chief of the Army Air Service, during the Fall of 1923 and the first part of 1924. The letters were produced by Maj. Hubert R. Jiarmon, assistant chief of the information division of the Air Service and junior aide at the White House. The first letter read to the court and signed by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt was dated November 10, 1923, and said that there seemed to be an Idea that the Army and Navy flyers should compete against each other in the annual speed classics. The suggestion was made that the two services were "sisterly," and that in pursuance thereof the opposing flyers should get together and agree to divide the races." 
"For instance," the letter said, "you take the Pulitzer races one year and we'll take them the other."

Patrick First Refused.
The reply of Gen. Patrick was to the effect that the suggestion was a good one, but that for the next year, "1924," the Army had already planned to build some high-soeed planes, and immediate enforcement of such an agreement would mean that no advance in speed, would be made at the next races. Gen. Patrick in his letter suggested that further details regarding the race agreements might be arranged by conferences later. 
In Col. Mitchell's now famous San Antonio statement, the colonel said, "We were stirred to action by the killing of Lieut. Pierson and Capt. Skeel in the dilapidated racing airplane during last October's air meet. This was caused by an arrangement between the Navy and Army that the Navy should take the races one year and the Army should take them the next year, thereby equalizing propaganda, not service"
In a letter dated January, 1924, Gen. Patrick advised Assistant Secretary Roosevelt that his "generous offer" that the racing planes be divided between the Army and Navy was accepted. 
Further testimony offered to substantiate Col. Mitchell's declaration that the lives of airmen are jeopardized because of untrained and unskilled mechanics in the Air Service and they were used "as pawns" when ordered to fly 60 miles out to sea in land planes to participate in the battleship bombing tests off the Virginia Capes was given by Capt. B. V. Baucom of the office of the Chief of Army Air Service and an outstanding observer in the World War.

Oldys' Recall Unnecessary. 
At the outset of today's session, Representative Reid moved to recall Capt. Robert Oldys, who was an outstanding witness yesterday, and have him correct the record of his testimony to bring out the fact Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall was not actually in command of the Hawaiian Island when Maj. Wheeler was killed in an airplane crash. 
Representative Reid said the inference was given yesterday that Gen. Summerall was in command when Maj. Wheeler was killed because Capt. Oldys testified he had received threats of punishment if more planes were damaged and had disregarded his life in an attempt to save his plane. THe court, however, thought the record of Mr. Reid's motion was sufficient to correct any impression that might be given, and then Representative Reid asked that Maj. Gerald C. Brandt. Air Service officer with the general staff, be called. 
At this point the question of witnesses out of town and residing at long distances from Washington was brought up by Col. A. H. White, military defense counsel, who thought the defense was entitled to them. 
Col. Blanton Winship, the law member of the court, temporarily ignored this matter, and addressing both counsels, he said: "The court feels it would like to be informed on the matter of testimony given by the defense. The trial judge advocate he stated he is willing to admit it as far as extenuation and mitigation. The court is somewhat in doubt as to the view of counsel for the accused on this matter and also as to whether an agreement has been reached between them."

Defense Move Explained. 
Representative Reid arose, and in a loud voice declared: "We expect to prove the truth of Col. Mitchell's statements as an absolute defense. If he (referring to the trial judge advocate) wants to consider it in extenuation or mitigation, it is up to him. We have no other inclination than absolute defense. He's letting it in as extemuation and mitigation." 
Col. Winship replied the court wanted to decide the question today, and would like to hear further from both sides. 
"The matter is indefinite as to what the counsel for accused expected and what the judge advocate expected."
Representative Reid connected this line of thought with the question of calling out-of-town witnesses, and declared: "If the expense of getting outside witnesses is too much for the Government we will withdraw our request to the prosecution for them and bring them at our own expense. He (again referring to the trial judge advocate) refuses to call some outside witnesses because, he says, the testimony is immaterial."
Col. Moreland replied the matter is wholly for the court to decide and, turning to the nature of the testimony, declared: "This evidence is admissible as matter in extenuation or mitigation. If the case is being tried on that theory it can come in. We are confident this is not admissible as absolute defense or partial defense, and therefore have refrained on the ground that it is coming on another theory. Furthermore, we feel it is up to the court to decide,"
"That's his idea, not ours," replied Representative Reid.

Court to Call Witnesses.
Col. Winship, addressing Representative Reid, asked if the proof would go on regardless of the way a decision was made, and when Representative Reid agreed, the law member put the question aside for the present and the long-distance witness problem again was taken up. Col. White, in response to suggestions from the law member if it was the latter's duty to pass on the question of summons, thought that it was a matter for the court. He said by conferences with the prosecution efforts had been made to eliminate as many witnesses as possible. Col. Winship thought the matter could be decided by himself, but Maj. Gen. William S. Graves moved that court be closed to consider the point, which he declared important in military procedure. On the return of the court Col. Winship announced that since defense counsel declared that the out-of-town witnesses were important and necessary they be summoned and the court sustained this opinion. 
An expression on the ruling of the court was asked of the trial judge advocate and he replied that he had talked at considerable length with the defense and if those witnesses are to testify as indicated he could not contradict the opinion of the court. 
Representative Reid then inquired if the prosecution had agreed on the stipulations of Hawaiian witnesses, adding, "They've had them for a week."

Moreland Explains Delay.
Col. Moreland replied he was endeavoring to obtain information which would enable him to sign the stipulations, but as the distance was so great he could not promise when the desired death would arrive. 
Representative Reid said the president of the court in agreeing to the defense witnesses had asked that radio, telegraph and telephone would be employed to get them to Washington. "We've been able to communicate with Hawaii and get all the information we want."
Col. Moreland told Col. Winship his desired information had been asked by cable, and then the law member said he presumed the witnesses agreed on today would be called by telegraph at once. 
The court then proceeded with the first witnesses, Maj. Brandi, who had been waiting at the entrance of the room while the witenss' question was being discussed. 
Before he began his examination of the witness, Representative Reid, approaching the president's desk, said: "This is Armistice day. I would like the court to call my attention when two minutes of 11 arrives, as I would like to make a motion for a brief observance."
President Howze remarked the matter would be taken care of by the court.
 
Witness Air Veteran. 
Maj. Brandt, in qualifying as a witness, said he was a graduate of West Point, had flown for eight years and had 1,000 hours in the air. His present duty is in the construction branch of the Supply Division, Army general staff. No previous experience is necessary for this duty, he said. His experience in the Air Service has been featured by commanding two of the largest aviation fields during the war and also directing the Army air forces in the Hawaiian maneuvers. 
Maj. Brandt told the court that there were two bombardment squadrons assigned for the Hawaiian manueavers, and that one of these had to be converted from a heavy bombardment group to a light unit for pursuit work. He said the two squadrons should have composed the total of 20 Martin bombers, but that there were only 9. The two pursuit squadrons, the witness said, comprised 21 planes instead of the usual 36. The observation squadron had its full quota of 16 shps. Maj. Brandt testified that the air force had only half the equipment and personnel that would be necessary in war time. 
Lack of a unified air command during the maneuvers resulted in greatly hampered operations and considerable dissension that would have been dangerous in actual war, Maj. Brandt declared in reply to questioning by defense counsel. 
"I recommended that one officer be put in command of the Army and Navy air forces," the witness said. "I considered a unified command absolutely essential. Capt. Yarnell of the Navy would have been in command of the joint air forces under this proposal. He was senior in rank to me.
 
Recommendation Failed.
"My recommendation was very emphatically disapproved by the commander of the 14th Navy District, Admiral McDonald. He said that only through him would orders be given for naval operations and this resulted in a very roundabout method of carrying out air plans. Our recommendation had to go through devious military channels before they reached Capt. Yarnell."
At this point Gen. Howze called a halt to the proceedings and had the entire courtroom stand at attention for two minutes as an Armistace day tribute. 
The period of silence over, the witness launched into a first hand account of the controversy which occurred during the war maneuvers over the suggestion of the Army air force that an immediate attack by launched on a fictitious enemy air base, supposed to have been discovered on the Island of Molaki, 70 miles from Pearl Harbor. Col. Mitchell's counsel previously had stated that testimony air forces refused to participate in a move to repulse the landing of "enemy" planes on this island.
 
Corroborates Charge.
Maj. Brandt corroborated this charge in detail, and offered in evidence the written refusal of the Navy in this connection. He explained that, as commander of the Army air force, he considered this occupation of Molaki Island by "the enemy" as a grave crisis, requiring immediate attention. He said he suggested during a special air conference on the U. S. S. Wright that the Navy air force join with the Army in a drive on the enemy air base. The suggestion, he asserted, was turned down by the Navy, which held that it was the firm duty of the Navy planes to locate the main fleet on a scouting mission.
"They said that Molakin was not so important as this scouting work,' Maj. Brandi said. "I asked them to put their refusal in writing and they did so." This document was introduced in the record. It referred to the suggestion of the Army that a joint air attack be made on the Molakin air base and said that this suggestion would not be followed by the Navy since their places were needed for scouting purposes and there were no other ships available. 
"In time of war, the landing of an enemy air force on Molakin Island, if interrupted," Maj. Brandt declared, "would have resulted in the capture of Pearl Harbor."
In response to questions by Representative Reid, the witness said that the conditions simulated war-time tactics, except that loaded guns were not used. He said that the two air forces were trained along two different lines of thought and that as a result they had divergent ideas, which made necessary some sort of unified command, so that the maneuvers could be co-ordinated. He said there was no such command, and there was no one to compel Admiral McDonald to give any orders "he didn't want to."
Maj. Brandt expressed the opinion that the enemy air base was discovered in time to discommode seriously the opposing air forces in landing places. The newspapers, he admitted, with the expectation of one, reported that the island had been captured. No conclusive decision from an official standpoint ever was given out on this point, he declared.

Grilled on Policies
Maj. Brandt was questioned closely regarding the air policies of the General Staff, of which he is a member. He said that occasionally he had had air service papers referred to him, "but not often." He said that questions of policy on air matters had not been put up to him, explaining that his services had been limited to "supply matters."
The witness said that proposed tests of anti-aircraft guns at Honolulu had been called off on the urgent recommendation of Maj. Gen. Patrick, chief of the Air Service. The grounds given by Gen. Patrick were that it would be "absurd" to try to test conclusively the effectiveness of anti-aircraft gunfire under the conditions proposed at that time, and would give the bulk of Navy officers present an erroneous idea of the efficiency of these guns.
Maj. Brandt pointed out that the gunners would have known the altitude and speed of the target at which they were shooting and declared this would not have constituted a test at all.
The witness said that, following the Hawaiian maneuvers, he reported to the commander of the Hawaiian department, to the chief of staff and to the chief of the Air Service that the air personnel taking part had been insufficient.
"Didn't you report to them that the air personnel was only 50 per cent sufficient?" asked Representative Reid.

Corps "30 Per Cent."
Col. Moreland immediately objected to the question, so the witness then was asked what he had reported. He replied that he had said that the personnel was about 30 per cent sufficient and that it had been necessary to take from their regular duties the commanding officers, the adjutant, the communication officer, the engineer officer, the ordnance officer and other officers, in order to provide pilots for all the planes at hand.
Maj. Brandt was questioned regarding Gen. Mitchell's report on the Hawaiian maneuvers, and was asked the substance of the indorsement on the report. He replied that the recommendations were based upon Gen. Mitchell's personal opinion, and that therefore no opinion would be given by the general staff. He answered in the affirmative when Representative Reid asked him if it were not a presumption that the assistant chief of the Air Service was appointed because he was especially efficient in his work. Asked if he would present to the court the report and its indorsement, he said that he didn't know if he could or could not, that some parts of it might be secret and deal with the strategic situation in the Pacific.

Sees Service Failing
He then was asked if he was familiar with the Lassiter board report, and after answering the affirmative was questioned as to whether it had ever been carried out, and he replied, "Not in any detail."
"Is the Air Service receiving a maximum development under the present administration?" asked Mr. Reid.
"No, as a matter of fact, it has more than ever deteriorated," was his reply.
He testified that the War Department had gone on record regarding the Lassiter report before the Morrow board.
Further questioning by Representative Reid developed from the witness that the Army had lost most of its best pilots because of resignations, and when Representative Reid sought to give a reason the prosecution objected, and the defense counsel withdrew the question. He was then led into a discussion of the conditions of flying fields at the present time. He testified that with the exception of two they were in a bad shape. Most of them, he said, were built in war times, and under ordinary circumstances would last but one year. If they want to use them, they would have to be rebuilt within a short time, he said.
He then was asked about specific fields and said they were inactive and in the case of Miller Field on Staten Island, said the Air Service had no unit to put there. He said that there were no air units in Alaska and he had never heard of any officers of the air department making a trip there or adjacent islands to make a study for defense and offense plans.

Cites Budget Reduction.
Then getting down to the question of the estimates for the Air Service, he said that the War Department cut down the recommendations for 1925 about 25 per cent, for 1926, 50 per cent. Asked how much this was in money he said that in 1925 the estimates were cut from $27,000,000 to $15,000,000.
Maj. Brandt then was asked if it was necessary to send officers from the War Department to Hawaii to handle the air force in the recent maneuvers and he said that apparently it was.
"Why?" asked Representative Reid.
"Because they had no war plans," the witness responded.
"Whose duty was it to draw up the war plans?"
"The duty of the staff and the commanding general."