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SIMS' ACCUSATION FLATLY DENIED BY WAR COLLEGE HEAD

Pratt Denies High Naval Officers Are Ignorant and Unfit for Posts.

DEFENDS AIR POLICY AS BASICALLY SOUND

Others Officers Dispute Air Colonel's Charges in Shenandoah Crash.

Rear Admiral William J. Pratt. president of the Naval War College, took direct issue with Rear Admiral Sim's statements that non-graduates of that college are "ignorant and unfit for high command" in testifying this afternoon for the prosecution at the Mitchell trial.
Admiral Pratt defended the Navy Department's air policies, pointing out that he himself had aided in framing them and declared that this policy had for its objective the procurement of mastery in the air over any possible enemy.

Admits Planes Needed.

Under still cross-examination by Representative frank R. Reid, counsel for Col. Mitchell, the witness admitted that no flying officers had taken a part in formulating the Navy air program. He insisted that the battleship was the "backbone of the fleet." but admitted that the fleet could not operate effectively without airplanes.
"I consider that the airplane is the most valuable adjunct the fleet has had in a long time," Admiral Pratt said.
While declaring that Admiral Sims was "a close friend and an able officer," he denied that it was absolutely essential for a high naval officer to have graduated from the Naval War College in order to fill high commands. He cited Admirals Eberle, Koontz, and Robinson as examples of non-graduates who had distinguished themselves.

Also Cited by Sims.

It was these officers whom Admiral Sims had cited specifically as being "uneducated" when he testified at the Mitchell trial.
Comdr. Noel Davis, U. S. N. R. F. and Admiral P. T. Wright testified in refutation of Col. Mitchell's declaration that an enemy submarine fleet could have hemmed the American Navy in San Francisco Harbor prior to its start for the Hawaiian Islands during the naval maneuvers in the Pacific.
Comdr. Davis said that is was not practicable to mine San Francisco harbor and that mines were ineffective anyway.

Would Take Much Time.

Comdr. Wright, who is a submarine expert, stated that it would take a submarine fleet three weeks to mine San Francisco harbor in the way Col. Mitchell described.
Col. Mitchell's charges hat the Navy Department was "criminally negligent" in sending the Shenandoah on her last flight were disputed today by high officers of the Navy Department called by the prosecution to testify.
Capt. Gatewood S. Lincoln of the Bureau of Naval Operations, the officer who prepared the order for the Shenandoah's flight to the Middle West, denied the Comdr. Lansdowne objected to making the flight, and asserted further that the latter and "full discretion" to ignore the instructions of his superiors if he had felt conditions warranted.
While admitting under cross-examination that he was not a "flying officer," the Navy's star witness of the day denied that he voluntarily commanded the movements of the Shenandoah, and declared that Comdr. Lansdowne alone was responsible for the actual movement of the ship on her Minneapolis trip.

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Eberle Conceived Plan.

The flight, the board was told, was originally conceived by Admiral Eberle, the chief of naval operations, and its primary purpose was to train the crew. Col. Mitchell has claimed that the Shenandoah went to her doom while engaged in a propaganda mission for the Navy. Much of the correspondence passing between Comdr. Lansdowne and the Navy Department regarding the itinerary of the proposed flight, already made public by the Shenandoah's court of inquiry, was entered into the record of the Mitchell Trial today.
Col. Mitchell's charges that efforts were made at the time of the Shenandoah's disaster to "muzzle" the press were denied by Comdr. J. H. Klein of the Lakehurst naval air station. He declared the statement of a newspaper man, called by the defense, to the effect that he (Comdr. Klein) had asked him not to publish a story about the probable cause of the disaster, was "incorrect."
He said that there were certain later developments at the scene of the Shenandoah crash that he felt ought not to be published and so stated to the newspaper men present, but declared these matters were not connected with the cause of the disaster. Col. CD. D. Hall, an Army survivor of the Shenandoah, who was the Air Service observe aboard the ship on her fatal flight, denied that the wreck was caused by anything other than the "dynamic forces of the storm," and expressed the opinion that parachutes would not have, prevented loss of life at the time.
John F. Victory, assistant secretary of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, produced a technical report on the design of the Shenandoah with a view showing the court that the Navy Department had consulted aeronautical experts in designing the airship. The report was admitted in evidence without the disclosure of its contents.
Lieut. R. G. Mayer, one of the designers and constructors of the Shenandoah, was recalled to answer this question by Mr. Reid: "Did you ever read a report by the other designers of the Shenandoah of her them state that the Shenandoah had certain weaknesses which would affect her disastrously if she encountered bad weather?"
"I recollect a statement made to the effect that under certain conditions the Shenandoah could be broken," the witness replied.

Lays Crash to Storm.

Col. Hall denied that the Shenandoah was wrecked because of the pressure of gas bursting her cells. He said that "the dynamic forces of the storm" were to blame. The valves had no connection with the disaster, he declared, but later admitted under cross-examination that it would have been unnecessary to employ manual methods of operating the valves if there had been sufficient automatic valves. He said that parachutes as now designed would have been useless on the Shenandoah, explaning under cross-examinantion that the crew would would not have had time to use them, anyway.
Cap. Lincoln was introduced as the naval officier who prepared instrucions for the movement of all naval vessels and as the man who prepared the orders for the last flight of the Shenandoah.
He testified, under direct examination, that Comdr. Lansdowne did not object to him about making the fatal flight, but had expressed an opinion to the chief of naval oparations in his presence as to the best time for making the trip. He said that the latter part of August or early in September was suggested by the Shenandoah commander. The witness asserted that Comdr. Lansdowne expressed himself as satisfied with the plans to make the flight, first to himself (Capt. Lincoln) and later to Admiral Eberle.
When Mr. Reid took over the witness for cross-contamination the witness stated he was not a flying officer.
"Do you know enough about airships to navigate one?" asked Mr. Reid.
The witness hesitated for some moments, and stated to reply, but Mr. Reid objected, and the question was reframed, as follows:
"Do you consider that you know enough about rigid airships to know when one should or should not be navigated?"
"I do not consider that I know enough about them to specify exactly when or when not to navigate one," replied the witness.
Capt. Lincoln said that Admiral Eberle initiated the plans for the Shenandoah's Western flight and admitted he was not a flying officer.
"Where did you get your first knowledge that the Shenandoah was to make a flight to the Midwest?" asked Mr. Reid.
"From Admiral Eberle or it may have been from Admiral Jackson," replied the witness, adding that this information had been conveyed verbally on June 9 or 10 of this year. Capt. Lincoln said that he was told at this time that it was desired to have the Shenandoah fly over the route originallyp lanned for the Los Angeles, namely, to Minneapolis and the Middle West. He said the Los Angeles trip had been proposed for June.

Lansdowne Visit Recalled.

He said after this conversation with his superior he wrote to Comdr. Lansdowne, June 9 or 10, regarding the proposed flight. It was brought out that the Shenandoah commander was ordere here to discuss the flight, and under pressure of cross-examination by Mr. Reid the witness said that Comdr. Lansdowne had discussed the difficulties of making the trip in June, laying stress on the possibility of the Shenandoah being endangered by storms while "on the ground."
He said that Comdr. Lansdowne later wrote a letter recommending that the flight be made the second week of September because of the limited time to prepare the facilities for receiving the ship at Scott Field, in Detroit.
"Did you concur in this recommendation of the Shenandoah commander?" asked Mr. Reid.
"I investigated the reason for this recommendation, and, upon finding the conditions he mentioned would no longer exist, his recommendations were not approved."

Mast Assured to Be Safe.

"Who investigated conditions at Scott Field and Detroit?"
"Lieut. Comdr. Rosenthal. The Bureau of Aeronautics assured us that that the mast at Detroit was satisfactory and that preparations could be made at Scott Field in ample time for the flight as planned."
The telegram dispatched by Capt. Lincoln to the Shenandoah commander on June 9 was produced by Mr. Reid. It was informed Comdr. Lansdowne that orders would be issued for the Shenandoah to make the mid-western flight planned for the Los Angeles. Another message, dated June 10, sent by the Bureau of Aeronautics to Lakehurst, ordered the naval air station to concentrate on getting ready for the mid-western flight "at the earliest possible date."
At the request of Mr. Reid the witness produced the entire correspondence on the Shenandoah flight between the Navy Department and Comdr. Lansdownwe and, by direction of counsel, Capt. Lincoln read excerpts of letters on various dates concerning plans leading up to the final decision. All of this correspondence previously had been made public at the Shenandoah court of inquiry and had been read into the court-martial record before.
Under cross-examination on the question of what discretion Comdr. Lansdowne had on the flight the witness declared to his knowledge the only definite request was to arrive at Des Moines, Iowa, on September 4. As far as the itinerary was concerned the Shenandoah commander could make modifications where he deemed necessary owing to weather or other causes, Capt. Lincoln added.
The itinerary for the flight was furnished the Navy Department by Capt. Lansdowne on request of the former, Capt. Lincoln testified, and when he was instructed to follow this route he telegraphed the department he did not think it "entirely practicable" to attempt Des Moines on the first leg. Capt. Lincoln said the department replied to this telegram ordering him to carry out the itinerary as indicated, "if possible."
"Have any captains in the Navy refused to obey orders?" asked Mr. Reid.
"It has been done," replied Capt. Lincoln.
"Did Capt. Lansdowne carry out what Admiral Eberle wanted done and what you wanted done?"

Orders Carried Out

"He carried out what the department wanted done."
On redirect examination by Maj. Gullion, Capt. Lincoln testified that Comdr. Lansdowne had expressed satisfaction with the preparations for the Midwest flight on August 18 or 19. "He told me personally." said the witness, "that he was satisfied with the arrangements for the flight. He also said the same thing to Admiral Eberle a little while later and in my presence."
"Were there any changes in preparations for the flight after this conversation?"
"Not to my knowledge."
Mr. Reid then took up cross-examination and asked if all commanding officers of the naval craft are allowed discretion in carrying out orders. The witness replied all have discretion, adding, "Every commanding officer is charged with the safe conduct of his ship, and in that duty within reasonable discretion to deviate from hos orders."
"What discretion did Comdr. Lansdowne have to turn back after he had gone over the mountains on this last flight?" asked Mr. Reid.

Had Full Discretion.

"He had full discretion to turn back," replied Capt. Lincoln.
"Are there any instances where a ship has turned back?"
"The Los Angeles did on account of engine trouble."
"Could she have proceeded? What else could she do?"
"If in his judgement the commanding officer though it was safe to continue he should turn back, and he did."
"What naval mission did the Shenandoah have to perform in flying over the State fair at Des Moines, Iowa, September 4?"
"Training the crew in operation and experience."
"Was it absolutely necessary that this should be done on this route? Could any other place have been selected."
"It could have been done and was. It was desired to make a trip at that time."
"Did you take into consideration the State fair at Des Moines in making up the itinerary?"
"The places were specified by me. They were designated by the chief of naval operations."
"In making up the list did they want the Shenandoah to fly over Des Moines for training?"
"That place was not necessary for training personnel."
"Would Comdr. Landowne have discretion when to start from Lakehurst?"
"Yes."

Officer Is Excused.

This concluded the examination of Capt. Lincoln and he was excused from the stand.
Before the next witness was called Gen. Howze announced "the court desires the trial judge advocate or his assistant to warn witnesses in advance that the court desires to hear what is said. The court sits with its back to the windows and there is so much noise coming in from the street from the street cars, wagons and automobiles that it is difficult to hear. Personally, I am tired of having to caution the witness to speak louder. This applies also to any one else."
Maj. Gullion announced the wishes of the court would be attended to and a brief recess was taken.