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EVIDENCE FINISHED
IN MITCHELL CASE;
ARGUMENTS NEXT
Star 12.16.25
Gullion to Present Navy Side
at Opening of Session
Tomorrow.

MITCHELL IS LAWLESS,
WEEKS TOLD COOLIDGE

Conduct Rendered Him Unfit as
Partick's Assistant, Secre-
tary Declared.

The prosecution and defense com-
pleted the presentation of al evidence
in the Mitchell case this afternoon.
and after much discussion on whether
the trial judge advocate would begin
his opening argument, the court re-
cessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
At that time Maj. Allen W. Gullion
will present to the naval angle of the
case.
John W. Weeks as secretary of
War recommended to President Coolidge
that Brig Gen William Mitchel
be not reappointed assistant chief of
the Army Air Service because he felt
that his whole course in that office
had been "so lawless, so contrary to
the building up of an efficient organization,
so lacking in reasonable team
work, so indicative of a personal desire
for publicity" as to render him
"unfit for high administrative position."
Mr. Weeks expressed this opinion
of Col. Mitchell's course as assitant
air chief in a letter to the President
dated March 4 which was brought to
light for the first time today when
read into the record of the Mitchell
court-martial by Maj. Gen. Dennis E.
Nolan acting chief of staff, appearing
as a prosecution witness.

Holds Mitchell Unfit.
Covering four pages and dealing
with national defense and Air Service
matters which the Secretary said were
"well known to Gen. Mitchell," the
letter concludes with this paragraph:
"Gen. Mitchell's whole course has
been so lawless so contrary to the
building up of an efficient organization.
so lacking in reasonable teamwork
so indicative of a personal
desire for publicity at the expense of
every one with whom he is associated.
that his actions render him
unfit for a high administrative position
such as he now occupies. I
write this with great regret because
he is a gallant officer with an excellent
war record, but his record since
the war has been such that he has
forfeited the good opinion of those
who are familiar with the facts and
who desire to promote the best interests
of the national defense."
The letter was written Mr. Weeks
said "because of the publicity given
the recent airplane hearings by the
committee of the House of Representatives
to which that question was
referred," and "I think I should explain
to you briefly why I am not
recommending the reappointment of
Gen. Mitchell as assistant chief of
the Air Service.
The circumstances leading up to
the introduction of the letter were
conducted by Col. Sherman Moreland,
who examined Gen. Nolan directly.
He asked the witness if he recalled
the recommendations of Maj. Gen.
Mason M. Patrick chief of the Air
Service, that Gen. Mitchell be "admonished"
for certain testimony before
House committees.
"Was the recommendation accepted
by the Secretary of War?" asked
Col. Moreland.
"It was not," replied Gen. Nolan
The letter then was produced and
identified and given to the defense to
examine. Representative Frank R.
Reid, chief counsel. announced there
was no objection to its being admitted
in evidence.
The concluding paragraph of
Mr. Weeks' communication of the President
sent a stir through the spectators,
which was the second thrill they
had received at the morning session
The first occured in the form of a
personal battle between Brig Gen H
A Drum assistant chief of staff and
Mr. Reid Gen. Drum elected to
answer questions propunded to him
on cross-examination by Mr. Reid in
his own way and for many minutes
Mr. Reid made much effort to maintain
patience.
The matter gradually approached
the boiling point it was evident to
every one present and the explosion
occured on Mr. Reid's questioning of
Gen Drum's statements regarding
the efficacy of 12 anti-aircraft guns
against "any bomber."

Drum Retort Is Sharp.
"Did you ever hear of one bomber being sent out to perform a mission over an important area?"
"I don't remember," replied Gen. Drum. "Do you, Mr. Reid?"
"Yes," the counsel replied sarcastically,
"Then tell us your war experience so we will be able to give weight to your statements." declared Gen. Drum, and the courtroom literally jumped to its feet.
"I was as much in my line during the war as you were in yours," snapped Mr. Reid, "and I wasn't a chief clerk of the general staff, either."
The courtroom was thrown into a turmoil, and Maj. Gen. William S. Graves rushed into the situation demanding the court be closed Order was restored immediately as the generals filed out into their own conference room. And when they returned President Howze made this announcement:
"The court votes that its proceedings be continued with proper decorum, and that such occurrences which have just cause the court to close will not rise again."
The matter seemed settled, and Mr. Reid pursued another line of questioning. For each question he received comprehensive answers from the witness, and his efforts to interrupt failed, as Gen. Drum ignored them.
Losing patience once more, Mr. Reid turned to the court and said: "If the court please, if he wants to make an address on every question I put to him. I'll sit down until he gets through. As far as the counsel for defense is concerned, we have nothing to do with these long answers. I trust the witness has violated every rule of court.

Reid Drops Witness.
Col. Blanton Winship, through Mr. Reid, asked a broad question when he requested the witness to detail his duties in France, and decided to allow Gen. Drum to continue. At this point, Mr. Reid said, "I want the record to show I am not interested in the further examination of the witness. In view of his refusal to answer direct questions proposed to him, I refuse to examine him further."
No effort was made by any one to persuade Mr. Reid to continue and the court then asked several questions, including one on the condition of plans for national defense at present. Gen. Drum replied, "The plans for the defense of this country never reached such a stage of perfection as they now occupy."
Gen. Drum was called to the stand this morning to enable Mr. Reid to conclude his examination begun yesterday afternoon. Much time was taken up in an endeavor to determine who directed Gen. Drum to represent the War Department and give its views to various committees on aircraft.

Letters Introduced.
Mr. Reid introduced many letters which he endeavored to establish were written by Gen. Drum and to prove that the witness himself initiated the move that he represent the War Department on aeronautics The witness maintained repeatedly he was ordered on this detail by Gen. Nolan, and when the latter took the stand he substantiated this statement. Gen Nolan, in his testimony, declared Gen. Drum had been designated "on my recommendation" because he had been a member of the Lassiter Board; had had a good background on aviation; was a chief of staff of the First Army, and had a good knowledge as to the use of aviation in battle. Further, he was sympathetic to the development of aviation in the Army.
Gen. Nolan also declared the War Department was opposed to a separate or unified Air Service and its views on this subject were clearly defined. He stated Gen. Pershing was responsible for the present policy in the War Department relating to the Air Service, that his views then represented the War Department's attitude on the question and still do. He read from Gen. Pershing's final report on retiring from the Army, which gave some of these views.
Gen. Nolan also read the Weeks letter. The full text of the Weeks letter follows:
"Dear Mr. President:
"Because of the publicity given the recent airplane hearings by the committee of the House of Representatives, to which that question was referred, I think I should explain to you briefly why I am not recommending the reappointment of Gen. Mitchell as assistant chief of the Air Service.
"One of the main questions which came before the committee was the testimony of Gen. Mitchell that we [[underline]]had but 19 airplanes fit for war service, when, as a matter of fact, we have 829 airplanes of different classes actually in use and 763 in storage.[[/underline]] The chief of the Air Service, Gen. Patrick, reports that we had on hand on September 30, 1924, 1,592 airplanes, classified as follows:

"Of those in storage 390 would have to be reconditioned before being place in use, at an average cost of $5,000 each, as they are war-build planes. As the War Department has developed new types of what it believes at least for the present to be standard types of pursuit bombardment and observation machines, it has not been considered best under present conditions to take action to reconstruct these 330 planes which would need to be reconditioned.

Outstanding Contracts.
"In addition to the machines enumerated in the preceding paragraph, we have contracts outstanding for 40 pursuit, 60 training and 109 observation planes, or a total of 209, and in the appropriation for the fiscal year 1926, available to the 1st of July next, a sufficient amount of money has been appropriated to enable us to place contracts for 158 training, 50 bombardment, 50 pursuit and 10 attack planes, or a total of 268 machines. When these contracts are completed we will not only have the 1,592 planes now on hand, which number, of course, will be reduced by planes worn out by a year and a half's additional service, crashes etc., but we will also have the number now under contract and those purchased out of the 1926 appropriations, or a total of 477 additional machines. Of the planes now on hand, Gen. Patrick has made the following statement:
"'It is a fact that pursuit and bombardment planes now in use by the Air Service were approximately equal to similar types employed by any other nation in the world. The De Haviland planes, observation and photographic, were possible surpassed, but to no great degree, by those used for similar purposes by other nations.'
"All this was well known to Gen. Mitchell when he apparently endeavored to startle the country by testifying that we had but 19 planes fit for war service, at the same time making no reasonable explanation of the number on hand and their condition.

Lassiter Board Report.
"It was further well known to Gen. Mitchell, as assistant chief of the Air Service, that the War Department has a well determined and worked out policy with reference to the Air Service, based on the report of what is known as the Lassiter Board, a board made up of some of the leading officers of the service, one of the number being an air officer. The report of the board, upon the recommendation of Gen. Pershing as chief of staff, and Gen. Hines as deputy chief of staff, was approved by me in 1923.
"The board recommended for the peace establishment of the Army, 2,590 machines, 4,000 officer, including reserve officers, and 25,000 enlisted men, to constitute the Army Air service. It recommended an appropriation of $25,000,000 a year for 10 years, which, in addition to the pay of officers and men recommended in the report and other expenses, would make the annual appropriation for the Air Service of the Army about $60,000,000. That is the goal of the War Department. We have not reached the goal because of the lack of sufficient appropriations to do so.
On the whole, however, it has seemed to me that we have preceeded [[preceded]] along a sound policy, not expending more money for planes while the War Department was busily engaged in determining new and standard types of machines.
"If we had spent large amounts of money in 1922, 1923 and 1924, it would have been in the construction of machines which have now been evolved. As we have determined definiate [[definite]] types, we should now, however, go on with a larger construction policy.
"All this was well known to Gen. Mitchell, and, indeed, if there has been any failure to expend the appropriations for the Air Service in the most economical and efficient manner, the responsibility for such failure rests almost entirely on Gen. Patrick as chief and Gen. Mitchell as assistant chief of the Air Service, as in the expenditure of money appropriated for that service the recommendations of the chief of Air Service have been approved.
"I think I ought to add that in my judgement the organization of the Air Service as provided in the War Department plans and policies, drawn in accordance with the provisions of the national defense act, is sound. The fact that our flyers held all the records of every kind of service except that for speed, which only within three months has been taken from us, confirms me in my judgment that our personnel is excellent. I should like to call attention to the fact that these records have been made in machines which are now in commission.

[[underline]]Officers Not Muzzled.[[/underline]]

"Furthermore, Gen. Mitchell has given the country the impression that officers of the army are muzzled and do not dare express their views. If any officer feels that way it is because he has not been informed of the policy of the department, and he could have obtained the information by making the slightest inquiry. I quote for your information an order issued by my predecessor in 1920 on that subject and my own instructions to Gen. Patrick when he became the chief of the Air Service.
"The rule of the department will, therefore, be that with regard to policies and facts which the public interest does not require to be kept confidential, officers are entirely free to testify as to their opinions and belief when summoned before appropriate committees of the Senate and House of Representatives; on all confidential matters, the Secretary of War, or those specially designated by him for the purpose, will speak under such safeguards as the Secretary of War sees fit to impose. All other effort, direct or indirect, on the part of officers to influence legislation affecting military policy [[?]] once be discontinued and not [[?]].
"My instructions were as follows:
"'Recognizing the undetermined value of aviation in warfare and wishing to obtain the judgement of anybody and everybody whose judgment is entitled to consideration, the best interest of the Nation will be served by encouraging officers in an unrestricted and full discussion of all points relating to aviation. In testifying before congressional committees, if their views are contrary to the views of the War Department, they will state to the committee that they are not speaking for the department policy, but are expressing their own personal view, and should do so without reservation.'
"In spite of and in the face of these instructions, which were well known to Gen. Mitchell, as Gen. Patrick had discussed these instructions with him before Gen. Mitchell testified on these matters, Gen. Mitchell, in testifying, is reported to have told the committee that it was almost impossible for it to obtain correct information from the services on aviation because of fear of officers that if they testified they would be subject to indirect disciplinary action by their departments. He further testified as follows:
"'Knowing full well the possible consequences of any disagreement with the views of the existing agencies of the Government on this subject. I have advised these officers in the services to keep out of the discussions and let me assume all responsibility.'

Went Counter to Policy.
"Obviously intending to give the committee of Congress and the country the impression that in spite of the explicit instructions of my predecessor, published in the general order quoted above, and of my personal and direct instructions to Gen. Patrick when he became chief of the Air Service, also quoted above, these officers were placing themselves in jeopardy by expressing freely and fully their personal opinions regarding necessary development of the Air Service. If Gen. Mitchell counseled officers not to give testimony as he has stated under oath he did he not only went counter to the policy of the department, but he contravened my explicit instructions to Gen. Patrick, which Gen. Patrick assures me he transmitted to Gen. Mitchell.