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the whole time that America was in the war. This certainly shows the futility of America attempting to make single-seater pursuit planes so far from the battle front. As to two-place pursuit airplanes, the British used in the war, 5 types; the French, 10 types; the Italians, 1 type; the Germans, 3 types. England changed types of her observation airplanes during the war, 20 times; France used 22 types; Italy 11 types; and Germany, 10 types. As to day bombers, the British developed 10 advanced types; France changed her types 7 times; Italy, 4 times. Of night bombers, the British developed 10 types; the French, 4 types; the Italians, 7 types, and the Germans, 6 types.
The Bolling Mission's experience in dealing with our Allies, and especially with the French, in the matter of patents, shipments of samples, and procurement of the necessary complete information our factories required if we were to construct any satisfactory wartime aeronautical equipment, had shown us the difficulty of getting things done where governments are involved. Delays were constant and often were of increditable magnitude. Types of airplanes required for the fronts changed more rapidly than women's millinery. In the summer of 1917, it became more and more evident to us, while retaining our faith in the ultimate success of the American program for 1919, that it would not be possible to put American made airplanes on the western front in the spring of 1918, as Premier Ribot had presumably requested in his cablegram of May 23, 1917. As a matter of fact, we felt that if America could by July 1, 1918, begin to get airplanes and engines to Europe, America would have done a remarkable job. The situation in Europe, and especially that in France, engendered more delay than anyone had expected. We naturally felt, when we sailed for Europe, by volunteering our utmost help to win the war, the Allies, and especially the French who had so much to gain, would do their utmost to make possible our early, successful entrance as a factor on the western front. Such was not the case. Anyone who has had dealings with the American government, realizes that even our own government is slow to move. Foreign governments are even more slow to move when dealing with foreigners whose methods differ, whose standard of measurements differ, whose manufacturing principles differ, who are regarded as commercial rivals, and whose thoughts of what are fair on royalties and in business are different. There was an unexpected delay in getting from allied governments complete plans of what this country should build. The governments themselves did not have the full information.

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